LABOR INCREASES POLITICAL PRESSURE

Reuben Rails against Taft-Hartley as AFL Grows Political

It was a dark time for labor. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act stuck a dagger into the heart of unions. In one fell swoop, laborers lost the right to negotiate for a closed shop or to strike in sympathy with their fellow workers. Unions were denied the right to contribute to the political candidates of their choice, restricting their ability to elect officials who could change the law. Worst of all, workers could now be barred from striking altogether, bound to their jobs by government decree, forced to work against their will. These restrictions, each a gross violation in their own right, mixed to form a toxic brew that threatened the vitality of union life.

That was no accident. Although it was billed as an attempt to “restore balance” to labor law and to allow workers freedom of choice, many recognized Taft-Hartley as nothing less than a deliberate attempt to destroy unions by industrialists with an axe to grind. As Reuben Soderstrom said in an interview that year, “The real reason for the union-busting section of the omnibus catch-all Taft-Hartley Act was the National Association of Manufacturers’ deep hatred of labor.”[1] Such hatred, he claimed, demonstrated contempt of democracy and of institutions, like unions, that allowed the majority to fight against organized business—“the employers, in their trusts, and in their combinations, and in their international cartels, and international combines.”[2] To Soderstrom and his allies, the fight against this ruinous act was nothing less than another war for American freedom; as he told crowds in speech after speech throughout Illinois, “The Taft-Hartley law is vicious because dictatorship elements run through it.”[3]

In response to Taft-Hartley, unions rallied for political change as never before. Organized labor had long been a force in politics; the AFL and CIO had over the past twenty years fought their way to a seat at the table in Washington, and they were not afraid to use that authority to pass policies favorable to their constituents. Many state organizations had likewise become profoundly influential, working to bring federal protections to intrastate industries. Reuben was both a product and a champion of this movement. Recruited by Illinois State Federation of Labor President John E. Williams to be “labor’s legislator,” Soderstrom first came to prominence by passing an unprecedented number of labor protections into law, including the first Injunction Limitation Act in 1925. This led to his election to succeed Williams as President and furthered the ISFL’s focus on pro-worker legislation. For thirty years he had worked the halls and lobbies of Springfield to secure pensions, safe workplaces, minimum wages, overtime pay and more. His efforts had earned him statewide and national attention, and throughout the 1940s he was sent to Washington and across the country as a labor policy expert. He was the man unions turned to when they sought advice on how to pass legislation.

Still, labor’s shift after Taft-Hartley was about politics as much as policy. While concerned with passing the right legislation, the AFL became even more interested in electing the right legislators. True, unions had long been a force in electoral politics, and Reuben was no exception; he had staunchly supported or attacked political figures based on their labor record for decades, and had begun ‘get out the vote’ labor campaigns as early as 1943. However, he always treated those endorsements and activities as a means to an end, and consequently resisted permanent political alliances, especially along party lines. Soderstrom was an outspoken supporter of FDR and the New Deal, but he also endorsed Republican candidates when he found them to be pro-labor. He personally served as a Republican during his tenure as an Illinois Representative, and frequently relied on Republican votes to pass legislation. Now, the American labor movement seemed on the precipice of a revolution, with politics assuming a much greater—possibly even central—role in the life of organized workers. Republican efforts to silence unions, particularly the Taft-Hartley prohibitions on political contributions, only served to accelerate labor’s change from a nonpartisan body into a firmly ensconced part of the Democratic coalition. In the words of historian Joseph Rayback:

The act produced a change of degree in the labor movement. After the first shock had worn off, organized labor turned to politics with a vengeance. “Repeal of the Taft-Hartley Slave Labor Act” became a watchword which brought about the revival or the creation of labor political agencies…the A.F.L., which had long practiced the policy of rewarding friends and punishing enemies and which now found its old efforts prohibited, created its first political arm—Labor’s League for Political Education—under the chairmanship of George Meany.[4]

The emergence of a permanent, separate political institution for unions was the single most important event for labor in 1948; in many ways, it was biggest change to union organization in the postwar era. As always, Reuben would be in the center of the storm, working with local and national figures to keep Illinois at the forefront of labor while attempting to shape the changes sweeping the nation. It would be no easy task.

AFL Creates Political League, Appoints Soderstrom Ally as Director

The biggest task Reuben faced as the political season of 1948 began was to overcome the election law morass that Taft-Hartley had created. According to the Act, labor organizations were prohibited from using any funds for the promotion of candidates in national elections. As early as December of 1947, the AFL Executive Council had recommended the creation of a Labor League for Political Education (LLPE) as a way around this restriction. The proposal quickly led to charges that the AFL was violating the law. In response, labor legal minds like Victor Olander, Illinois Federation Secretary and Reuben’s most trusted adviser, asserted that:

The League was organized in conformity with the law…The League is under the control and direction of trade union members, but it is not subject to direct control and direction by action of the trade unions acting as such, except through expressions of approval or disapproval. The League is financed by voluntary contributions on the part of its individual members and other supporters. Trade union funds are not used directly nor indirectly in the League’s activities.[5]

This defense was somewhat dubious. The League’s Chairman was William Green, President of the AFL, its Secretary-Treasurer was George Meany, who was also Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL, and the League’s National Committee was comprised of the AFL Executive Council and the presidents of all affiliated unions. However, while there was considerable overlap in leadership, the financial separation was more complete; the league relied solely on voluntary contributions. More fundamentally, Victor, Reuben, and others viewed the ban as a violation of their rights, and were consequently more concerned with the letter (rather than the spirit) of the law, which they intended to repeal. Despite this, they all envisioned the new League as a permanent institution rather than a temporary workaround—a new body which would breathe new life into labor’s political fight. As Victor continued:

The League was not organized to circumvent the Taft-Hartley Act. The intent and purpose is to continue the League as a permanent organization even though the Act may be repealed…The promoters of the Taft-Hartley Act, instead of succeeding in their efforts to frighten the trade unions by ugly threats of restrictions by law, have aroused union members to a greater sense of their responsibility as citizens and voters. The net result, in time, will be exactly opposite to that expected by the Taft-Hartley conspirators. They have exposed themselves to the power of the American voter.[6]

It was a grand boast, but unfortunately at the start of 1948 the LLPE was little more than a nice idea. The AFL spent months seeking a suitable director, preferring a former politician for the task. League Secretary-Treasurer Meany approached former Senators James Mead, Bob La Follette Jr., Matthew Neely, and Burton Wheeler, all of whom turned down the post for various reasons. As the League struggled in its search, it was an old political ally of Reuben’s, Joseph Keenan, who became the de facto director.[7] Joe, like Reuben, was a former child laborer who became active in the Illinois labor movement at about the time that Soderstrom made his first run for office. In 1937, when Keenan was elected Secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor, Reuben was one of the key speakers at his welcome dinner, personally congratulating him on his appointment.[8] Now, as the assistant to the Executive Officers of the League, Keenan was in a prime position to help Reuben bring national funds to Illinois, which he did to great effect. Soderstrom’s preferred candidates received more money from the LLPE in 1948 than any other state.[9] Before winter’s end, Keenen’s position as permanent director was virtually assured; as Meany wrote to state federation officials that February, “As you are no doubt aware the preliminary work of establishing a permanent headquarters and staff for Labor’s League for Political Education has been going on for some time. We are happy to inform you that this work is now practically complete and the League is now in a position to start active operation.”[10]

Meany’s assessment may have been overly optimistic. As Keenen later recounted, “We just started from scratch, had no program, we just—we were not organized.”[11] That March, Meany invited Soderstrom and the other state presidents to Washington D.C. to figure out exactly how this new national organization would funnel funds to the races that needed it most. At a conference in the Rose Room of the Washington Hotel, Reuben and the rest attempted to chart a path forward.[12] A mission began to emerge; the League would inform union membership and the public at large about issues and candidates, compiling politicians’ records through a Department of Political Direction. A Department of Public Relations would utilize every form of media to spread their message, from speeches to radio spots to political cartoons. The Department of Finance would hold fundraising drives, with half the amount raised spent locally and the other half sent to the national office for targeted races. Most important of all was the Department of Organization, which would establish registration drives and coordinate action on national, state, and local levels.[13]

Reuben’s State Labor League Wages Primary Fight

Despite detailed planning, it required an extensive amount of time and effort to properly construct such a complex organization. On March 17, after returning from the LLPE conference, Soderstrom and Olander immediately established their own Illinois Labor League in anticipation of the national effort.[14] But without national coordination, there was little that Reub’s Illinois League could do outside of endorsing candidates. It was months before the League was able to lay claim to a true national network; the LLPE took until the summer of that year to fully establish state and district offices.[15] Many local unions, informed in December of 1947 that “the League was coming,” grew restless when spring came and passed without attempts at coordination. As one frustrated Chairman from Rockford, Illinois wrote to Reuben that May:

We in Rockford have been aware for some time that the National Political Education League, and State League, was in the process of being formulated and set up. Since January, we have acted on our own here, and attempted to do something along that line. Now, our members are asking me as Chairman, where we fit. So, I am asking you at this time to inform me as to what, if anything, I can do to coordinate our activities with the overall activities of the Political League…I would appreciate an early reply with a frank explanation from you or your office as to what the picture should be.[16]

Soderstrom clearly shared his members’ frustration. While the LLPE took its time and focused on the general election cycle, important primary races were well underway, and Reuben sounded the alarm that unions were leaving potentially successful pro-labor candidates to wither on the vine. On January 12, 1948, Reuben sent a thorough political assessment to AFL President Green, detailing exactly which seats he felt were or could be in play. In contrast to his upbeat and ambitious public speeches, Reub’s private communication to Green displays an analysis that was clear-eyed, calculated and direct:

Seven Illinois Congressmen voted against the Taft-Hartley bill. It looks as if all of them will be returned to Congress. Illinois has twenty-six members of Congress. Nineteen of them voted for the Taft-Hartley law and are regarded as enemies of labor. Chicago Republican Congressmen with bad labor voting records can be defeated in the fall election by and with Democratic opposition—but downstate Illinois is pretty solidly Republican, and if downstate Republicans are to be defeated at all, it must be done in the April Primary.[17]

Reuben then detailed the situation in every downstate district. Four anti-labor candidates, he predicted, would be eliminated through redistricting and retirement. Of the seven remaining downstate Republicans, four were relatively safe. There were three candidates, however, that Reuben felt could conceivably be beaten in the Republican primary—Congressmen Noah Mason, Chauncey Reed, and Rolla McMillen. Soderstrom advocated for early and direct investment in the candidates’ political campaigns, writing:

I think the A.F. of L. can be successful against Reed, Mason, and McMillen. If financial help is to be given their opponents—Miller, Trowbridge and Springer—it ought to be forthcoming quickly. A dollar spent now, in my judgment, is worth more than three dollars sixty days from now. These are April primary fights and since the candidate is about the only person who knows where the weak spots are in his district, I would like to suggest that A.F. of L. attorneys, or someone who knows the political game, place financial contributions directly with the candidates after a proper investigation has been made.[18]

The problem with Reub’s request, of course, was Taft-Hartley. Direct political contributions of the kind Reub was requesting were now illegal, and the LLPE was in no state to start donating to candidates. Reuben did all he could to support Miller, Trowbridge, and Springer, stumping for them at every opportunity. He officially supported all the candidates as Chairman of the Illinois LLPE. As Chairman of the Joint Labor Legislative Board of Illinois—a political body which included the Illinois State Federation, Chicago Federation, Women’s Trade Union League, Railroad Brotherhoods, and civil service groups—he further secured broad endorsements for all his candidates.

Soderstrom also continually posted the Joint Labor Legislative Board Recommendations in the ISFL Weekly Newsletter, rallying union members to vote for his preferred candidates in the primary. The move was a risky one. In February, the Department of Justice instituted prosecutions of CIO President Phillip Murray for publishing a political endorsement.[19] Some, including ISFL attorney Dan Carmell, feared similar prosecution could befall the ISFL if they likewise took a political stand in their publications.[20] Unafraid, Soderstrom published a highlighted article in the very next issue of the ISFL Weekly Newsletter labeling the candidates who voted for Taft-Hartley as “against labor.”[21] He published the list again and again, week after week, telling the union faithful to “REMEMBER the names of the Illinois members of Congress who disregarded the pleas of organized labor and voted to place the Taft-Hartley Act on the statute books!”[22] On March 15, Federal District Judge Ben Moore dismissed the Justice Department indictment against Murray, declaring that the Taft-Hartley ban on political spending “is an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.”[23] Jubilant, Reuben ran the story as the headline of the next ISFL Weekly Newsletter, reprinting the court’s opinion in full alongside the Joint Labor Legislative Board’s recommended candidates.[24]

Despite these courtroom victories and endorsements, Reuben’s candidates faced a significant uphill battle. They were all upstart, pro-labor candidates challenging incumbents in primary campaigns in heavily Republican districts. Complicating matters even further was the difficulty in uniting the political opposition behind a single candidate. The clearest example of this was the primary fight in Reuben’s home, the Fifteenth US Congressional District. Reuben’s choice, Cyrus Trowbridge, faced opposition from not only the incumbent Mason but from a third candidate, Henry Buckhardt, whom the CIO and the UMWA (which, after briefly rejoining the AFL, had again disaffiliated earlier that year) as “labor’s choice.” C.F. Mascal, Secretary of Streator’s Building and Construction Trades Council, wrote to Reuben in early February looking for instruction on what to do, telling Reuben:

It seems the A.F.L. man is Trowbridge but [UMWA] District 50 is talking up the other man. As you know District 50 has a lot of members in LaSalle Co, and it seems that some kind of a meeting should be called in our county to try and work out something, for both organizations to try and get back on the same man. The Streator Building and Trades Council has but one purpose, and that is the defeat of Congressman Mason, but as things now stand this cannot be done with two men in the race, and we not knowing which is the strongest.[25]

Reuben pushed back hard in support of Trowbridge, telling Mascal:

Cyrus Trowbridge is definitely pledged to vote to repeal the Taft-Hartley law. I have no similar pledge from any other candidate for Congress in the 15th Congressional District…All of the information we have about Mr. Buckhardt and Congressman Mason runs against them so far as a recommendation is concerned. There are those who believe that Mr. Buckhardt is merely a ‘stooge’ for Congressman Mason, that he was planted in the campaign for the purpose of splitting Mason’s opposition.[26]

After weeks of negotiation, it became evident to Reuben that, despite his support and the Joint Labor Legislative Board’s endorsement, the CIO would not budge on Buckhardt. With the election on the line, Reuben couldn’t allow his personal preference for Trowbridge to cloud his judgment, nor did he want to give the man false hope. When the editor for the labor publication in Will County informed Reuben he intended to endorse Buckhardt, Soderstrom saw the writing on the wall. On March 17, he took on the responsibility of breaking the news to Trowbridge personally, bluntly telling him:

The candidate for Congress in the 15th District who can poll 10,000 votes in LaSalle County, 500 votes in Boone, 1,5000 in DeKalb, 500 in Kendall, 2,500 in Grudy, 5,000 in Will, could—in a three-cornered race—be nominated…In all likelihood no more than 45,000 votes will be cast on the Republican side in the 15th Congressional District. I talked with Editor Miller over the phone this morning and he doesn’t seem to think you can get 5,000 votes in Will County. He would like to have you cease campaigning and unite all labor on Candidate Buckhardt. Mr. Miller argues rather logically that the A.F. of L. vote is vetoed by the CIO vote, making the situation ridiculous. Maybe he is right. However, the decision to cease campaigning rests with you. He agreed to button his lip until I had seen Joe Keenan next Saturday morning.[27]

Despite the impossibility of the situation, Trowbridge refused to concede. Publicly, Reuben continued to support him, but began to qualify his support, telling reporters “If we can’t do it in April, we will turn Democrats in November.”[28] As the primaries approached, the local papers cast the vote as a referendum on labor strength. As the polls tightened in key races, the Freeport Journal-Standard breathlessly reported:

One of the hottest campaigns being waged is in the 22nd district where a county judge is trying to unseat Republican incumbent Rolla C. McMilllen of Decatur. Champaign County Judge William Springer has the backing of the Illinois League for Political Education, an off-shoot of the Illinois Federation of Labor. Reuben Soderstrom, president of the IFL, has predicted McMillen’s defeat. Other incumbent Republicans marked for defeat by Soderstrom are Rep. Robert Twyman, Chicago, 9th district, and Rep. Robert Chiperfield of Canton in the 19th district. Both have labor endorsed opponents. The three contests might provide a tip-off on how successful labor will be in its attempt to send a friendly Illinois delegation to congress in November.[29]

The results were not encouraging. As the votes were tallied the following week, it became clear that none of Soderstrom’s picks succeeded in their primaries. Incumbent McMillen narrowly defeated Judge Springer in the Twenty-Second, beating him by a mere 4,309 votes (55% to 43%).[30] Mason clobbered Trowbridge and Buckhardt, garnering more than 57% of all votes cast (as Reuben predicted, less than 45,000 votes were cast).[31] Reed and Twyman won their primaries as well. It soon became clear that if Reuben were to defeat the friends of Taft-Hartley, he had to step up his game.

REUBEN RESISTS PARTISANSHIP, ENCOURAGES DEBATE

Supports Governor Green, Nonpartisanship

As disappointing as the Republican primary fight had been, it was soon overshadowed by the struggle over whom Illinois labor should back for Governor. Reuben had long been opposed to the current Governor, Dwight Green. In the 1944 election, he had fought the Republican incumbent tooth and nail, dedicating his convention speech that year to an attack on him. As the Alton Evening Telegraph reported at the time:

Reuben G. Soderstrom, president of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, opened the federation’s 62nd annual convention today with a denunciation of Gov. Dwight H Green as “easily the worst governor Illinois has ever had so far as the aged and unemployed are concerned.” Declaring he would vote Nov. 7 for the Republican governor’s Democratic rival, Thomas J. Courtney, Soderstrom termed Green’s administration with respect to the aged and unemployed “a nightmare, a bad dream, a snare and a delusion.”[32]

But Reuben’s opinion of the man he once accused of having “crippled the women’s eight hour law and one day rest in seven law” had shifted remarkably in the last four years.[33] The groundwork for reconciliation was first laid in July of 1944, when the Governor replaced coal merchant Francis Murphy, whom Reuben had bitterly opposed, with union man Robert Gordon as Director of Labor. In the 1945 General Assembly, Gordon stood alongside the ISFL and the Chicago Women’s Trade Union League as they pushed through legislation protecting women and minors. Still, the 1945 legislative session ended with the Governor vetoing important labor legislation on environmental protection and the recognition of unions for state and local government employees. This time, however, Reuben did not attack the Governor personally, carefully limiting his condemnation to the veto itself.

It wasn’t until the legislative session of 1947 that Reuben and Green truly began to reconcile. In many ways it was a union of political necessity. Soderstrom, facing a hostile General Assembly and mounting national momentum against labor, needed the Republican Governor to come out against the anti-union legislation his party was pushing in order to stop the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association’s march in Illinois. Green, meanwhile, was facing strong political headwinds; a “parade of scandals” had tarnished his once-sterling reputation, including an evolving revelation concerning off-record payrolls.[34] At the same time, the embattled Governor was eyeing a possible presidential run as a dark horse candidate, and needed labor support to solidify his image as an executive able to work across party and ideological lines. Despite their prior animosity, Soderstrom and Green needed each other.

Putting the past aside, both men made good on their promises—the Governor to halt anti-labor legislation, and the ISFL President to prevent major work stoppages— to the benefit of all. Illinois became known across the nation as “practically the only big industrial state with no so-called ‘anti-labor’ laws,” while Reuben ensured the state remained free of major strikes.[35] The Governor came out in support of the right to strike, declaring “the right to refuse to work is still the cornerstone of the worker’s freedom.”[36] Reuben likewise told the labor faithful of the 1947 Convention that “Labor in Illinois has made more progress under Dwight H. Green than labor has made in any other state under any other governor at any other time.”[37]

Others in labor, however, were uneasy with the sudden shift. Many were particularly incensed at a series of articles by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch revealing a “culture of corruption” in the Green Administration which may have been responsible for the deaths of over 100 miners.[38] As the general election season approached, Reuben’s public statements in support of Green began to encounter fierce resistance. One letter to Reuben from P.A. Lautz, Secretary of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Lodge 1524, provides an example of the anger some directed at the ISFL President. Citing news articles reporting Reub’s endorsement of Green, Lautz wrote:

If this is true, why I am surprised by your attitude. In 1944 you were against Gov. Green and now you highly endorse him. Why the turn about face? It seems to me that you ought to take stock of yourself before endorsing the Gov. at this time. Sure the Gov.’s record had been everything but clean. I think his chances of being elected are mighty slim. How come you are on his side?[39]

Union rank and file weren’t the only ones asking the question. Millburn Akers of the Chicago Sun Times also got into the act. Recounting Reuben’s vehement earlier opposition to Green, the reporter wryly noted:

Since then, Brother Reuben has seen a great light, or something… It’s a strange case, this conversion of Brother Reuben. While he has been finding reasons to reverse his judgment of four years ago, others, who did not altogether agree with him then, have now reached his 1944 conclusions…In fact, Brother Reuben, who once branded Green as the state’s “worst Governor,” appears to be the only recruit he’s picked up lately.[40]

Reuben responded publicly that his support of Green was not new. He was simply following the AFL tradition, begun by founder Samuel Gompers, of supporting the incumbent by default if their current record was “good from the labor viewpoint,” and Reuben believed Green’s crucial support in labor’s darkest hour satisfied such a requirement. As he told the press, “We’re for the man who is in (office) if his labor record is okay. Gov. Green is all right. There has been no anti-labor legislation in this state.”[41] Privately, Reuben suspected that much of the anger over his backing of the governor was tied to party politics. He was increasingly concerned that labor was losing its nonpartisan focus, and was in jeopardy of becoming captured by the Democratic Party. As he wrote to Lautz:

Organized labor has a tried and true policy initiated by the late Samuel Gompers which intelligent labor tried to carry out, viz: to elect our friends and defeat our enemies regardless of party. There are some working people who still support the party regardless of what the candidate does or stands for. I do hope this number has become small in the movement of labor because this practice tends to make both major political parties unfriendly to us. They seem to believe, and with some justification, that working people will vote for the party that makes the best declaration no matter what the candidates might do.[42]

Unfortunately, partisan concerns continued to overpower labor’s interests in the governor’s race. When Reuben proposed an official endorsement of Green to the Joint Labor Legislative Board that summer, he encountered fierce resistance from those who feared that an endorsement of the Republican governor might hurt the chances of Democratic senatorial candidate Paul Douglas in his race against the anti-labor Wayland Brooks. As Soderstrom wrote in a letter to Green after their August meeting:

I feel a little chagrined about the Joint Labor Legislative Board’s failure to openly endorse your candidacy…At this meeting, your evident strength and popularity became an argument against adding your name to those recommended. Great pressure was placed on all state labor legislative representatives to help Paul Douglas, and some of the railroad men argued that while Governor Green has a fine labor record, an endorsement of Green would hurt Paul Douglas...However, I want you to know that all but one of the Illinois State Federation of Labor representatives on the Joint Board were then and are now supporting your candidacy for re-election to the office of Governor.[43]

National Campaigns, Partisanship, and the Communist Threat Posed By “Industrialist Dictators”

The Senate race wasn’t the only high-profile contest of dire concern to labor. Harry Truman, the “accidental president,” was facing his first Presidential election, and all signs pointed to a defeat for the Commander in Chief. Although his relationship with union leaders was sometimes cantankerous, Truman stood up for labor when they needing him most, vetoing the Taft-Hartley Act before he was overruled by the Republican Congress. It was that Republican body, not the opposing candidate Thomas Dewey, against whom Truman contrasted himself as the election approached. In an open letter to labor, he reminded workers:

The party that pressed the Taft-Hartley act upon working people over my veto and is responsible for the high cost of living is asking labor to vote for its candidates in November. Having inaugurated in the Republican-controlled 80th congress a blueprint for tearing down 16 years of progress under the Democratic party, the Republicans are now asking labor’s support for their anti-labor policies. The 80th congress was guided by Republican policies and was completely under the thumb of the Republican Party. The Republican candidates cannot disavow the party leadership which dictated these policies. Neither are these policies repudiated in the Republican platform to which the candidates are committed.[44]

Dewey, in contrast, never mentioned the Taft-Hartley Act in his addresses to labor. Instead, he made sometimes thinly-veiled accusations that unions supporting his opponent were betraying not only their membership, but the nation as well. “We must zealously guard against…efforts to make the American labor movement a political company union,” he warned, adding, “Knowing the A.F. of L. as I do, I would expect to find in it very few men who would sell out the interests of their members and their country for political preferment.”[45] Dewey’s not-so-subtle attack on the patriotism of union officials was a clear nod to the Republican belief that labor leadership was infested with communist sympathizers. This corrupt cabal, so the theory went, hated Taft-Hartley because it weakened their control and crippled the influence of communism. Those who subscribed to this theory believed the rank and file of labor would support the Republicans in the coming election because they were fundamentally at odds with their leadership, and saw Taft-Hartley as an escape from union oppression. Reuben pushed back hard on the accusation, dedicating his Labor Day Message to counter such arguments:

The American labor movement is unalterably opposed to Communism and all other alien doctrines which interfere with the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of worship, and the other guarantees given all citizens in the Constitution of the United States, which make up our way of life. It would be a dark day, indeed, if labor had to look forward to oppressive domination from Moscow.[46]

In the end, the partisan nature of the coming election on both sides—with Truman rhetorically running against the Republican Party and Dewey obliquely equating voting Democratic to supporting communism—made a nonpartisan labor endorsement seem nearly impossible. Soderstrom, however, remained optimistic that the democratic principles of the AFL would ensure unions secured endorsements for the candidates that furthered labor policy, not political party, interests.

Resolves Convention Crisis, Settles Election Endorsements

Reuben’s dedication democracy would soon be put to the test. As the 1948 Illinois Federation Convention approached, it became clear that the sixty-sixth gathering of the ISFL would be one for the record books. As the Freeport Journal-Standard reported:

Approximately 1,500 delegates have already been elected to attend. About one-fourth of them bring their wives, which will increase the attendance to a point where the seating capacity of the convention hall will be taxed. The galleries are open to the public. All sessions are open to those interested.[47]

The group promised to be as loud as it was large. The passage of Taft-Hartley and the months of campaigning against it had whipped the delegates, gathering a month before the coming election, into a near frenzy. Attendees were fired up and ready to go, eager to make their voices heard at the ballot box. Reuben opened the convention with a fiery political address that shook off the dust of the primary and rallied his troops for November 2:

In the fall elections there is a chance to accomplish some of the things we failed to accomplish in the primary. There is a chance to defeat (Robert) Twyman, there is a chance to defeat Congressmen Busbey and Vail, and a splendid opportunity to fill the place made vacant by the death of Congressman Owens with a friendly congressman…When the fall election is over, and this is a conservative prophecy, labor will have at least 14 congressmen out of 26 from Illinois who will be willing to repeal the Taft-Hartley law. This is making real progress because in the last session of Congress we only had seven men who were friendly to us.[48]

But of all the Illinois offices at stake, Reub roared, one stood out above all the rest:

But the big opportunity offered to labor in the fall election is the opportunity to secure a friendly United States Senator. Senator C. Wayland Brooks voted for the Taft-Hartley law. He is unfriendly to labor and ought to be defeated. Professor Paul Douglas, of the University of Chicago, is friendly to labor and ought to be elected, and there is the opportunity to do just that, based on the election returns of the April primary…Senator Brooks did not receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary by the voters in the two major political parties and he should not be permitted to receive a majority of the votes cast in the fall election! United States Senators from Illinois have tremendous voting power…one United States Senator from Illinois has the voting power of 13 Congressmen. Under such circumstances we should work day and night and move heaven and earth to elect Paul Douglas.[49]

Reub’s unequivocal support of his good friend Douglas quickly emerged as the highlight of his speech. The next day, the papers reporting on the convention led with headlines such as “Illinois Labor Federation Head Endorses Douglas” and “IFL President Backs Douglas.”[50] Reub’s choice to highlight the Senate race, however, wasn’t just meant to underscore the Illinois Federation’s commitment to the race to the general public. It also served to separate the race for governor from the more partisan congressional elections. While dedicating almost his entire opening address to the US House and Senate races, Reuben didn’t mention the gubernatorial fight once in his speech.

Despite these efforts and assurances, Reuben still faced strong opposition from the ISFL delegates. The Executive Board had already officially endorsed candidates for the Senate and each of the 26 US Congressional districts, all of them measured by their support or rejection of Taft-Hartley. Many delegates, however, wanted the party to go further. Already, some had questioned why the ISFL had endorsed four Republicans when there were perfectly acceptable candidates on the Democratic ticket. One of those Democratic hopefuls, Marvin Peters, had appealed to Reuben personally, writing:

In a recent press release the Chicago newspapers reported that the Illinois Federation of Labor had endorsed Richard W. Hoffman, the Republican candidate for Congress from the 10th Illinois District. I am the Democratic candidate. I have no information as to Mr. Hoffman’s relation or relations to organized labor. I do know, however, that I consider myself to be a friend of labor, interested in the labor movement and in favor of the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act. My father, Ernest J. Peters, is a retired member of Local 9 of the Electrical Workers and my brother, Lester J. Peters, is a member of the DuPage Council, Painters and Decorators. Both locals, as you know, are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor…I believe that I am entitled to the endorsement of the Illinois Federation of Labor and would greatly appreciate a reconsideration of the endorsement of a candidate for Congress from the 10th Illinois District.[51]

The ever-pragmatic Reuben, however, was brutally blunt with the aspiring representative who believed he was “entitled” to labor’s vote as to why he would not receive ISFL support. He response also gave a useful window into Reuben’s philosophy of nonpartisanship and the importance of primary elections:

Dear Mr. Peters:

The 10th Congressional District is heavily Republican and labor supported Richard W. Hoffman in the April primary in order to make sure we would have a friendly candidate on the Republican side. On April 13th there were twice as many Republicans voted in the 10th Congressional District as there were Democratic votes cast. There are large groups of progressive people in both major parties and working people should not hesitate to cross party lines to vote for their friends. Where a Republican has as good a chance to win as he has in the 10th district labor tried to make sure the right kind of Republican would be nominated in the April Primary. In that we succeeded.[52]

Reuben’s logic also likely applied to the ISFL’s support of Republican candidates in the 4th and 21st district, which had new Republican candidates who promised to repeal Taft-Hartley. Soderstrom’s support of CW Bishop in the 25th District was likewise based on his vote against Taft-Hartley in the 80th Congress.[53] Resisting all efforts and opposition, Reuben remained firm in his conviction that action, not affiliation, should be the sole measure for labor support.

Still, labor delegates pushed back at the convention. As the week progressed they began to clamor for endorsements of Democrats Harry Truman for President and Adlai Stevenson for Governor. Delegates easily passed a resolution of approval for Stevenson, much to Soderstrom’s dismay.[54] To Reuben, the timing of the presidential endorsement was almost as problematic as the choice of candidate for the governorship. He and his board fully intended to endorse Truman, but he believed doing so before the national AFL convention threatened to both undermine the perception of a unified labor lobby nationally and could make unions appear overly political locally. As Olander told the delegates in favor of the resolutions, “You have bench-warranted yourself into an out-and-out political organization…I don’t think you are counting the cost of changing from a labor organization to a political organization.”[55]

Despite his own opposition to the resolutions, however, Soderstrom did not use his powers as president to in any way limit debate. Instead, he allowed all members to speak their mind, relying on persuasion and strength of argument rather than force of authority. He pleaded with members to think critically about the gubernatorial endorsement, recalling the precedent of endorsing friendly incumbents by quoting Gompers’s admonition that “We must elect our friends and defeat our enemies.”[56] He asked for patience on the Truman resolution, promising members that the executive board, 93% of which was on the record in support of Truman, would make a formal expression of support for the president as soon as the national AFL had done so.[57]

In the end, Reuben met with mixed results. He lost the argument on the Truman endorsement, an outcome that made front-page headlines across the state. “IFL Overrules Chiefs,” the Associated Press breathlessly exclaimed, writing:

Declining to wait for some expression from the American Federation of Labor, the Illinois State Federation of Labor Friday endorsed President Truman for re-election. Reuben G. Soderstrom, federation president, asked the delegates not to endorse political candidates at this time ‘because the American Federation of Labor has not yet taken sides’…However, after two hours of debate on the question of endorsement the delegates knocked down by a 346 to 265 vote a recommendation of the resolutions committee to refer the endorsement to the executive board.[58]

Less noted, but even more important, was the delegates’ decision to hold off on an endorsement for governor. As the AP mentioned further in their story, “The IFL also endorsed Paul H. Douglas, Democratic candidate for US senator, but referred to its executive board a resolution that would have endorsed Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic candidate for Governor.”[59] Persuaded by Soderstrom, the delegates ended the convention without formally weighing in on the gubernatorial race. A few weeks later, Reuben called a special meeting of the Executive Board of the ISFL and endorsed Green, telling reporters:

Green has earned the support of the federation and AFL members in the state by his record of having 93 pro-labor bills enacted into law and 67 anti-labor bills defeated in the legislature in his eight years as Illinois governor…(Green is) an outstanding friend of labor who has been on our side in every legislative crisis in the last eight years.[60]

While Truman’s endorsement grabbed more headlines, the Green endorsement mattered far more to Reuben. It was deeply important to him that labor in Illinois remain nonpartisan. If elected officials believed their party affiliation either barred them from or entitled them to labor’s votes, they would feel no need ever to act on labor’s behalf. The Green endorsement, given in the midst of such a partisan election, preserved Gomper’s call to “elect our friends” no matter what party they hailed from.

The incident also demonstrated Soderstrom’s dedication to the democratic principles to which he had adhered, allowing full discussion and even passage of resolutions he opposed. This style of leadership stood in stark contrast to other more publicity-seeking labor figures like John L. Lewis, whose dictatorial control of the UMWA was legendary. Lewis’s commitment to “organizational discipline” may have gathered him power and press in the short run, but it also proved his undoing. When faced with opposition, Lewis took an absolutist approach, purging dissenters when possible and splitting with his spoils when he couldn’t. Consequently, by 1948 Lewis had both lost control of the CIO and his post within the AFL, isolating his UMWA in the process.

Reuben, meanwhile, continued to oversee an unprecedented growth of membership within his ISFL by ensuring all voices were heard. The ISFL convention fight of 1948 was perhaps the clearest example of this approach; as the ISFL Weekly Newsletter noted, “the Convention was a lively affair from start to finish…all present were ‘kept on their toes.’ The interest never flagged. It continued until {the?} gavel dropped on the last word at one o’clock of the sixth day.”[61] True to his word, Reuben never used that gavel to silence discussion. In the words Anton Johannsen, Circulation and Business Manager of The Federation News, “In opening the convention you pledged the delegates that the gavel would be used to the end that everyone who had any message or suggestion would be afforded equal opportunity, which was carried out by you to the letter. I have heard a great many comments from delegates, all of which were very complimentary to the manner in which you handled the convention from the chair.”[62]

PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON DEMOCRATIC LANDSLIDE: “LABOR DID IT”

Throughout all the trials and tensions of 1948, Reuben had managed to keep the ISFL united, bipartisan, and strong. He helped birth a whole new organization, the Illinois Labor League, making it the most well-funded LLPE in the country. He secured the endorsements of his candidates of choice despite deep opposition. Still, he had faced his fair share of defeats as well, from the (in his view) premature endorsement of President Truman to the disheartening primary election results. Unfortunately, despite all his and organized labor’s efforts to the contrary, polling predicted a repeat of the primary experience, primarily in the presidential race. “Gov. Dewey and (Vice Presidential candidate) Gov. Warren are assured of election,” wrote Archibald M. Crossley, Director of the Crossley Poll, on the eve of the election. “Their electoral vote is likely to be well over the 266 needed for election. The Truman-Barkley ticket, on the other hand, with every possible consideration, is unlikely to have more than 219.”[63]

To make matters worse, Reuben’s pick for Governor was failing to distinguish himself from his Republican peers. He still viewed labor as crucial to his success—he had his own “Green for Governor Labor League” and touted his labor record at nearly every appearance, claiming “the workers of Illinois have found they always get a fair and square deal at Springfield.”[64] Still, his message was overshadowed by the other members of his ticket, particularly Senator Brooks. In the final weeks of the race, Green sat silently while Brooks called Taft-Hartley “a bill of rights,” bragging, “the New deal is on the rocks, its crew has deserted and its captain, an incompetent, confused and frustrated man, is sinking to political oblivion. A new day will dawn for America on Tuesday when millions of Americans will turn to the Republican Party for hope, confidence and unity.”[65] Stevenson taunted Green to respond, calling on him to “come out of your corner,” and complaining Green “has been strangely silent on the issues of this campaign.”[66]

Still, as the final days approached, both Green and Brooks seemed even more assured of winning than Dewey. Nearly every poll showed them winning by a comfortable margin. It increasingly became clear that a Republican sweep of the state would be a major blow to unions, despite Green’s assurances to the contrary. Days before ballots were to be cast, Brooks claimed in a written statement his race “has national significance because it is a testing ground of sentiment on the Taft-Hartley bill.”[67]

He couldn’t have been more right. On November 2, 1948, the American people shocked the pollsters and press by handing a strong win to Democrats across the country. Truman succeeded handily, carrying 28 states to Dewey’s 16 (Strom Thurmond, running on the segregationist Dixiecrat ticket, carried the remaining four). That list included Reuben’s Illinois, where Truman won by a little over 57,000 votes. Truman was in little doubt as to who made his win possible. According to historian David McCullough, “In the noise and excitement of the Presidential Suite after Dewey conceded, Truman reportedly said, ‘Labor did it.’”[68]

Illinois Democrats also took the governorship and twelve House seats. Most importantly, Douglas defeated Brooks by an astonishing 417,386 votes.[69] It was a resounding win for labor, and Reuben was ecstatic. Even Republican stalwarts like Fred Busbey, the outspoken conservative congressman who denounced Douglas as “a friend of the Commies,” went down to unexpected defeat.[70] True, Green had lost, but Stevenson was a friend of labor as well, and Reuben’s most important prerogative—to maintain the nonpartisan nature of federation endorsements—had already been satisfied. Moreover, many could point to Green’s close association with Brooks, especially in the closing days of the election, as the reason for losing crucial union votes. Soderstrom called the results “the political awakening of labor,” saying:

The defeat of United States Senator C. Wayland Brooks and of Congressman Fred E. Busbey was an event of transcendent importance to the workers of Illinois. Senator ‘Curly” Brooks and Congressman Busbey had paraded themselves before he people of the state as the chief exponents of the infamous restrictive anti-labor law known as the Taft-Hartley Act. They sought re-election on the hypocritical and utterly false plea that the Act was favored by the workers themselves as a means of curbing the activities of the men they elect from time to time to represent their respective unions…With Brooks went Busbey and other Taft-Hartley advocates. Together they dragged down most of their own State party and changed Illinois from a Republican to a Democratic state. It was the Taft-Hartley payoff in Illinois.[71]

Back in Springfield, Reuben celebrated the unqualified victory with his oldest, dearest friend, Victor Olander. Basking in the success they had helped bring, they looked to the future with a hope and optimism they hadn’t experienced in years. Over the past two decades they had jumped from crisis to crisis, facing depression, war, and more—but they had always faced it together. Now, for the first time, they could envision a path forward unburdened by the imminent threat of catastrophe and collapse. It was a brave new world, and they were ready to enter it side by side.

Sadly, neither had any idea of the loss that awaited them.

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