NATIONAL ROLE MODEL

Reuben Overcomes Local Resistance to Merger

Reuben hit the 1960’s running. Just days after the start of the New Year, Soderstrom left for Washington, D.C. to join the State Organization Conference (SOC), a massive gathering of State Organization officials called “for the purpose of discussing ways and means of strengthening the existing cooperation between National and State Organizations and also to explore the techniques for expansion of our future efforts.”[1] While it sounded innocuous, the gathering was a high-stakes affair for Reuben personally as well as for organized labor as a whole. The AFL-CIO was facing a potential crisis in its national-state relations, and the 1960 conference, charged personally by President Meany to Soderstrom’s care, was the most comprehensive effort yet attempted to address the issue. Its success or failure would fall squarely on Reuben’s shoulders and its outcome could determine the fate of labor for decades to come.

The problem was long in coming. Five years after the national merger of the AFL and CIO, many state and local central bodies had yet to fully and properly merge. Several state organizations, including Reuben’s ISFL, had spent years arguing over often hotly contested details, a process that had left many scars and abiding rifts. Worse still, even in merged states several local central bodies remained separated, in open defiance of national and state mandates. Illinois was no exception to this rule; the Chicago Federation of Labor and Cook County Industrial Union Council, for example, had yet to come to terms despite the statewide merger over a year earlier.[2]

Even those bodies that were merged suffered from declining affiliations. The new AFL-CIO did not require a union to join their local and state federations; national unions were supposed to instruct their locals to affiliate, but there was no consequence if a local ignored this instruction. Consequently, many CIO-originated unions defected from their AFL-dominated state and central bodies. As Immanuel Ness and Stuart Eimer note in their history of the Central Labor Councils:

By 1959, the issue of affiliation with central bodies had reemerged as a point of contention…A delegate from the Michigan AFL-CIO indicated that he was tired of listening to national union presidents “give the most profound lip service to political action” while telling their local unions they could freeload on the backs of the local bodies that were responsible for carrying out political functions…He concluded by declaring “I am tired of freeloaders, not only the freeloader who comes into our shop and scabs and doesn’t pay his dues to the local union; I am kind of tired of the freeloaders who are riding on our backs, taking all the benefits our subordinate organizations give us and paying back nothing.”[3]

Tempers were aflame; not since 1925 had anger and dissatisfaction among central body members run so high. Many state and local delegates wanted to make affiliation mandatory, an approach Meany staunchly resisted on the grounds that it violated union autonomy. In response, the 1959 AFL-CIO National Conference adopted a resolution recommending that Meany appoint a committee to work with the national body to increase affiliation, and that December the National President called upon his most seasoned state operator, Reuben Soderstrom, to help plan the massive conference to address the issue.[4] All eyes and hopes were on the Illinois President.

Reuben didn’t disappoint. The State Organization Conference (SOC) was a typical Soderstrom affair – inclusive in constitution and tightly orchestrated in action. Reuben personally arranged the agenda, with representatives from all the State Central Bodies listening to addresses by a parade of national officers and departmental directors.[5] At the close of the conference, a small committee composed of legislative staff, a few select state officers, and Reuben himself gathered to formulate a clear and comprehensive proposal to address the crisis.

Soderstrom knew that any recommendation of mandatory affiliation would be dead on arrival, as federal and international unions would never give up their right to voluntary association. Instead, Reuben took a more subtle but effective approach; at the heart of his recommended reforms was an incorporation of state and local body interests into the national leadership structure, creating a permanent and empowered office representing state and local bodies within Washington. After a summary statement cautiously praising the work of the conference as a “profitable first step in the direction of developing closer relations…and creating better understanding” between the state and national bodies, Reuben gave his SOC’s assessment on how to fix the mess. First, he said, the AFL-CIO needed to create a Washington-based Department of Central Bodies charged with helping state and local organizations achieve “maximum affiliation.” He further called for a standing advisory committee of state and local bodies composed of the AFL-CIO President, the Director of COPE, the Legislative Director, the Director of Organization, and the Director of his proposed Department of Central Bodies. This Committee should also include an “adequate number of principle officers of state central bodies.” In return, central bodies would submit to greater national oversight, adopting a uniform annual reporting system to provide the national headquarters with information on income, expenditures, principle activities, affiliates, and unaffiliated locals. Finally, he wanted to make the SOC an annual affair, ensuring all state officials had a voice.[6]

It was a clever proposal, one that would integrate the central bodies more fully into the national AFL-CIO structure, making them more accountable while simultaneously granting them greater agency, all without surrendering the principle of voluntary affiliation. In response, President Meany created the new post of State and Central Bodies Coordinator, naming Tennessee State Federation President Stanton Smith to the post.[7] Sadly, however, Soderstrom’s other recommendations were not acted on. Smith’s role as Coordinator was far inferior to the directorship Reub sought. The position was crafted as an additional role to be taken on by a sitting State President, rather than as a full-time Washington-based post in charge of a staffed and funded department. No regular forums were given to central body officials, nor were their representatives given a voice on a standing advisory committee. Meanwhile, most supporters of state and local federations continued to push for mandatory affiliation, a futile struggle that largely ignored Reuben’s more nuanced approach. Had Reuben’s recommendations been pursued, the AFL-CIO may have been spared decades of strife and state and local decline. Still, the diluted reforms introduced in the wake of Soderstrom’s efforts helped to ameliorate the damage; Smith’s office brought renewed attention to the issue, and subsequent conventions used that office’s findings to initiate new studies and positive reinforcement programs designed to encourage state and local affiliation.[8]

Defends Entitlements, Supports Political Unity and Action

While important, the State Organization Conference was far from Soderstrom’s only national involvement that year. While in Washington for the SOC planning meeting, Reuben attended a Problems of the Aged Conference featuring Charles Schottland of Brandeis University, Nelson Cruickshank of the AFL-CIO, Eveline Burns of Columbia University, and Wilbur Cohen of the University of Michigan - four Social Security experts who, according to Reub, believed “Americans would soon be secure from cradle to grave.” As he detailed in his article “Security for All” for the Illinois Carpenter and Builder later that year:

Experts agreed that during the next 10 to 25 years, Social Security pensions will increase at least 50 per cent…Medical and hospital care will be available to all Americans regardless of their ability to pay, probably through a combination of private and Social Security insurance programs. Unemployment benefits will be increased and extended far beyond the present maximum of 26 weeks and will not be cut off during a recession…Persons who are temporarily as well as permanently disabled not only will receive Social Security benefits but also will be rehabilitated and re-trained by the Government. Every family that does not have a wage earner will be aided by the Government as a matter of right rather than of charity. “We shall surely see medical care for the aged added before too long,” Prof. Burns predicted, “and I cannot believe that within 25 years many people will not be asking why a policy that is good for those whose productive life is ended is not good also for children who are the producers of the future.”[9]

Such optimistic predictions certainly excited Reuben; this was, after all, the security he had spent a lifetime fighting for. Care for the old, the sick, the disabled, and the unemployed had been central tenants of his political career, from his passage of widows’ and orphans’ pensions in his early days as a legislator through his championing of old age pensions and unemployment compensation at the height of the Great Depression to his expansion of occupational disease and workmen’s compensation benefits as Illinois AFL-CIO President. Even more important to Reuben than the amount of these benefits was the principle of ownership—that these things were not gifts from industry but rights earned by and owed to workers, guaranteed in law and secured by government. To Soderstrom, “entitlement” was not a dirty word, but a holy one.

However, a lifetime of legislative fights had convinced the elder statesman it would take more than optimism or even moral certainty to secure these rights. It took legislative action, and labor’s friends those days, in his estimation, were far too few. As he described in an address prepared for the University of Illinois Industrial Relations Institute’s Central Body Conference:

The rough-riding, strike-breaking, union-busting employer organizations are planning more tyrannical legislation…President Eisenhower’s signature had hardly been attached to the anti-union Landrum-Griffin bill before the cheering squads for the anti-unionists resumed their clamoring for further oppressive and restrictive legislation. The United States Chamber of Commerce, publicly gloating over the enactment of this unfair statute, which it forced through a spineless Congress, was not satisfied. These sadist representatives of the vested interests, sensing that the labor movement is reeling and staggering from the stab in the back inflicted by the Landrum-Griffin law, is now planning to close in for a finishing, fatal strangling blow. What other conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the lackeys of the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and other union-hating groups in Congress who are barnstorming around the country shouting to all who will listen that the time has come to destroy the trade union movement—to finish the job?...

It is distressingly obvious that labor has been wasting time by depending upon our so-called friends in Congress, particularly the Senate, to save us because our real friends there can be counted on one hand, not including the little finger or thumb![10]

Given such sentiment, it was likely with a heavy dose of skepticism that Reuben departed for the DC Willard Hotel for a three-day national legislative conference held by the AFL-CIO. The Conference, which began a mere two days after the close of the three-day SOC, focused on what Reub described as “a two-pronged legislative program—geared to winning congressional enactment of ‘enlightened public interest legislation’ and to heading off passage of further ‘unfair restrictive’ labor measures.”[11] Over the next several days, Reub lobbied several Illinois members of Congress on labor’s agenda in Congress and heard from congressional leaders on their plans for the coming congressional session.

One of the biggest topics under discussion at the conference was the renewed focus on the Committee on Political Education (COPE). Established by the first AFL-CIO Constitutional Convention of 1955, COPE was a merger of the AFL’s Labor League for Political Education and the CIO’s Political Action Committee. It was constitutionally charged with “encouraging workers to register and vote, to exercise their full rights and responsibilities of citizenship and to perform their rightful par in the political life of the city, state, and national communities,” and was composed of local and state committees of AFL-CIO members as well as a National Committee overseen by Meany himself.[12] In practical terms, COPE had three priorities: picking candidates, mobilizing voters, and raising cash—all vital elements if labor candidates had any hope of winning elections. As Soderstrom’s Weekly Newsletter described:

When a candidate for public office campaigns, he must pay for such things as TV and radio appearances, newspaper advertising, billboards, secretarial help, telephones, travel and a multitude of other things. In an overwhelming number of instances the only place where a labor endorsed candidate can get the money to pay the expenses is from working people themselves. For it is certain he won’t receive financial aid or other help from corporate executives.[13]

While conservative interests decried COPE as “big labor” attempting to buy seats, the AFL-CIO was quick to respond that they were simply attempting to level the playing field. After all, as labor pointed out:

Eight families of enormous wealth contributed more money to candidates in the 1956 elections than the entire labor movement, with 16 million members. That is one good reason for the COPE Dollar Drive this year. Less than $1 million of the $33 million spent on campaigns in 1959 came from labor. Here’s the sad story: the Du Ponts, Pews, Rockefellers, Whitneys, Mellons, Vanderbilts, Olins and Reynolds spent $1,004,986. The entire labor movement spent $941,271.[14]

During the legislative convention that January, COPE representatives made one thing crystal clear: they intended to involve themselves to a greater degree than ever before, coordinating political action on national, state, and even local levels:

There is only one place where the elections this year—or any other year—will be won: in the precincts. That means that the success or failure of organized labor’s political activity as expressed through the program of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE), rests in the grass roots.[15]

For Reuben, such coordination seemed crucial. In fact, he viewed the missions of these three conferences—the State Organization Conference, the Problems of the Aged Conference, and the AFL-CIO Legislative Conference—as deeply intertwined. Only united, organized action, Reuben believed, could achieve labor’s goal of creating the secure future for all working Americans that Social Security prognosticators proclaimed. As he explained:

One thing is certain—we must work together in the labor world—more unitedly than ever before. We must think and work as a team in closer unity that ever before. Our merger on the national level has had the effect of mobilizing not our strength, but uniting that of labor’s enemies. To make our own national merger effective we must bolster up and eliminate any defects in our organizational structure.

We must organize the unorganized. We must build up our membership through concentrated organizing campaigns. We must reactivate our slumbering local unions. We must reject every incumbent lawmaker who is seeking re-election, in every district where there is a contest, unless such lawmaker is a genuine friend of labor, freedom, and humanity…As I see the situation the shock troops of the reactionary forces plotting our destruction must be withstood no matter how frequently they attack us. The chips are down and obviously there are two ways for us to go—to fold up and go out of business or to forge ahead, to fight on![16]

Such coordination carried unforeseen costs, however, and Reuben himself would experience the price of intense national action (and interference) before the year’s end.

POLITICAL BATTLE LINES

Reuben Exerts Endorsement Power Over State Politicians

While Reuben may have held a dim view of the national situation, he felt considerably more confident about the state of labor in Illinois. As he detailed in his address to the attendees of the Central Body Conference:

The silver lining in this dark national outlook appears brighter within the states. In the General Assembly of Illinois the labor movement has never retreated. Here in this State we have had the help of the members of the Legislature in defeating the same identical features which were enacted in the Landrum-Griffin bill. The General Assembly of Illinois defeated the secondary boycott limitation proposal and the anti-peaceful picketing provision. In fact the General Assembly of Illinois joined with the officers and members of the State AFL-CIO in our effort to resell our employers on honest, sincere collective bargaining as the only sensible and profitable method of stabilizing the industries of this great State.[17]

Soderstrom had indeed achieved remarkable success in Springfield, a victory he attributed in no small measure to Illinois labor’s resistance to party capture. Reub refused to let his organization give a free pass to a politician just because she or he had a “D” next to their name, and through the Joint Labor Legislative Board he had continually supported Republicans who had favorable voting records with respect to labor. This approach had helped Reuben score legislative wins and defeat bad legislation in Illinois even as the Republican Party held control of both the Senate and the Governorship. Of course, Democratic politicians publicly touted any statement of support from Soderstrom early and often. For example, in 1960 Representative Fern Carter Pierce, running in the farm-heavy 32nd District of Boone, DeKalb, McHenry and Ogle counties, repeatedly singled out Reuben’s endorsement. Although she claimed the support from “farm, labor, business, educational, financial and welfare organizations,” Reub alone was quoted in the newspaper advertisements she ran on the eve of her primary election, proudly claiming:

Reuben G. Soderstrom, president of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, recently said of Mrs. Pierce’s record: “Representative Pierce has served two sessions successfully in the Illinois General Assembly. In fact, she has attained an unbroken legislative voting record on the side of wage earners, on the side of labor and humanity!”[18]

Rep. Clyde Choate likewise sought Reub’s endorsement to bolster his chances in the general election that year. When the Democratic House Majority Whip wrote to Reuben in search of a ringing endorsement, the renowned orator didn’t disappoint:

Your labor voting record has been better than good—It has always been excellent! In the last regular session it was again 100% perfect and I want to extend the appreciation and thanks of all branches of organized labor to you for this marvelous support. It is the prayerful hope of the officers and members of the entire labor movement of Illinois that our local trade unionists in the 58th Representative District will make a special effort to return you to your seat in the Illinois House of Representatives.[19]

Still, Reub didn’t hesitate to endorse Republicans whom he believed had demonstrated a positive record on labor. Outside of his own son Carl (a Republican Representative holding his father’s former seat), the most notable example of this was Soderstrom’s support of the Republican Governor William Stratton. Stratton had long been an ally of Reub’s, most importantly in blocking the passage of such anti-labor legislation as the anti-picketing and proposed right-to-work acts. Many anti-labor bills that failed to pass Republican chambers during Stratton’s tenure likely floundered due to the Governor’s open opposition, driving many Republicans to at least abstain from voting in favor of passage.

Just as Soderstrom counted on Stratton, the Governor had come to rely on Reuben as well, promoting him to positions of authority so he could secure passage of important legislation pertaining to their common interests. 1960 was no exception; that year the Governor had placed two bond issues before the voters for ratification—a $195 million bond for the University of Illinois Building Program to provide “proper housing facilities for a potential future 60,000 students” and a Public Welfare Building Bond meant to “relieve crowded conditions in our state hospitals,” particularly mental institutions.[20] Reuben was already an outspoken advocate on both fronts; that March he had (at the Governor’s request) co-sponsored the Twelfth Annual Mental Health Week in Illinois, writing to Gov. Stratton “There is a growing interest in the labor movement with respect to Mental Health activities and I want to express my thanks to you for including a representative of labor as a joint sponsor.”[21] So when Mrs. Byron Harvey’s resignation opened up a post on the Board of Public Welfare Commissioners, Stratton knew exactly who he wanted to tap as her replacement.

Advocates for Mental Health and Education Infrastructure

Governor Stratton formally appointed Reuben Soderstrom to the Board of Public Welfare Commissioners on June 23rd, 1960.[22] Reuben certainly was unique among the board members; as his hometown paper wrote at the time:

The nine-member board acts in an advisory capacity to Dr. Otto L. Bettag, director of the state department of Public Welfare, on mental health and conditions at the state’s mental institutions. It is made up of medical men, educators and sociologists. Mr. Soderstrom is the only representative of labor on the board.[23]

If there was any doubt as to the reason for Reuben’s appointment, however, it was put to rest with his first public comment on his new position:

In commenting on his appointment, Soderstrom, who was reached at his home here today, said his organization was vitally interested in the proper care of mental patients, and that during the last session of the Illinois General Assembly, he gave strong support to legislation calling for a referendum in November on a proposed $150 million bond issue to relive crowded conditions in institutions.[24]

Reuben wasted no time ginning up support for the Mental Health and Public Education bonds. He forcefully and repeatedly made the case, both in the press and in speeches to union meetings and State Councils. He cited the great need as well as the relatively small sacrifice these measures required, telling members “University officials say that their bond issue, which will cost taxpayers about $1.25 a year for 25 years, was more than necessary considering the rise in university enrollments…The welfare building bond issue will provide about half the structural improvements needed…(and) cost taxpayers 95 cents a year for 25 years”[25] He even dedicated his Labor Day speech that year to the effort, telling the labor faithful that “The two bond issues…are badly needed and it is to be hoped that all our union people will not only vote for them, but also urge all other progressive-minded citizens to do the same thing.[26]

As he had in times past, Soderstrom put aside personal animosity in service to the cause, working alongside traditional foes like the Illinois Retail Merchants Association’s Joseph Meek and Chicago Manufacturer Arnold Maremont (who believed the bonds’ failure would result in a state income tax) to win popular support. That fall Reub lent his voice to Maremont’s “Emergency Committee for 50,000,” a pro-bond campaign named for the 50,000 patients in Illinois mental hospitals and welfare institutions “whose comfort, care, treatment and welfare depend on the bond issue being passed.” As Maremont shored up conservatives, Reub drew liberal support, telling his base the bonds deserved the support of “all progressive minded citizens.”[27] The biggest opposition, meanwhile, came from the Illinois Agricultural Association, which launched a counter campaign arguing that the needed repairs should come out of current funds.

Ultimately, these efforts yielded dramatic results. As Reuben wrote in the wake of the election:

Aside from the November 8th election itself, the universities’ and welfare institutions’ 345 million dollar building bonds issues were the most vital ballot proposals before the Illinois voters for a decision…Without the work performed by the officers of the State Building and Construction Trades Council and State labor movement, the farm opposition could not have been overcome. There is justifiable rejoicing, therefore, throughout the labor world over the adoption of these bond issues.[28]

Reuben wasn’t alone in attributing the success to labor’s efforts. As Dr. Otto Bettag, Director of the State Department of Public Welfare wrote to Reub in wake of the bonds’ passage:

In [sic] behalf of the department’s 50,000 patients and wards, its more than 14,900 personnel and the host of others who will benefit over the years, I wish to express deep appreciation to you—and through you to the membership of your fine organization—for your efforts in the interest of the $150,000,000 public welfare bond issue. The truly outstanding support given by labor publications throughout the state, highlighted by the coverage in the Federation’s weekly newsletter, kept the bond issue constantly before one of the most important and influential segments of the voting public. Meetings and other community efforts by union locals also contributed significantly to the final result. I cannot let this occasion pass without expressing my personal and official gratitude to you and Mr. Stanley Johnson, Executive Vice President, for the active roles you played in this connection.[29]

Congress Serving “Mickey Finns” to Labor

Surely, Soderstrom’s energizing of the labor community played a large role in the bonds’ ballot successes. But labor votes alone could not have passed these initiatives. As he had with his considerable pro-labor legislative record, Reuben credited the measures’ success to support from across the aisle. It was this nonpartisan approach that Reuben wanted to bring to the national political conversation, which he strongly felt had become disjointed. In his estimation, the national AFL-CIO had become too closely aligned with the Democratic Party, leading the latter to abuse the relationship and take labor votes for granted. As he bluntly put it, conjuring up the abuse of unsuspecting victims with drug-laced “Mickey Finn” cocktails:

One frightening and paralyzing legislative “Mickey Finn” after another has been fed to American wage earners by both major political parties until their confidence in their friendliness to labor has been completely shattered. Consequently there will be less crossing of the labor movement within political parties in the future. The Gompers Policy of examining the voting record regardless of whether he calls himself a Republican or a Democrat, will determine whether he deserves labor support. Liberalism is definitely dead in both major parties and organized labor must return to the old program of being partisan to principles and not to political parties…Unless we divorce ourselves from identity with political parties we will be crucified with a rash of legislative “Mickey Finns”—and moreover—we would deserve the hangover and headaches and oblivion such political stupidity will bring. This is not a retreat; it is good political sense.[30]

Soderstrom Denounces Lyndon B. Johnson as Kennedy’s VP Pick

This capture, Soderstrom said, was the reason for the failure of labor’s national legislative agenda. The Democrats had taken organized workers for granted, while Republicans had given up hope of courting their vote. Reuben was ripe for an opportunity to publicly air his frustrations, and when Democratic Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy picked Texan Senator Lyndon Johnson as his running mate in the summer of 1960, Soderstrom stuck. All of labor was furious over the choice; since World War Two, the conservative southerner had a built a reputation as being both anti-union and anti-civil rights; President Meany called Johnson “the arch foe of labor” and worked hard publicly in private to force his removal from the ticket.[31] Even Meany, however, wasn’t prepared to go as far as Reuben. On the eve of the Republican National Convention, held in Chicago that year, the national Republican committee hosted a labor luncheon in the Mayfair room of the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel. Soderstrom was of course invited to the event, where New York Governor (and rumored Vice-Presidential nominee) Nelson Rockefeller made a play for labor votes, boldly declaring that “union members and working people will go Republican like never before in the history of the country.[32]” The most newsworthy remarks from the event, though, came not from the potential Vice-Presidential candidate but from Reuben himself, who told reporters that Kennedy had “made chumps out of leaders of the American labor movement when he dictated the choice of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson as the candidate for Vice President.” Calling the nominee’s labor voting record “bad, bad, bad, thoroughly bad!” the Illinois labor leader darkly warned “The selection of Johnson as Kennedy’s running mate puts a quietus, a wet blanket on the enthusiasm, usually shown by labor for the Democratic nominees.”[33]

The reaction from labor was swift. Correspondence from labor leaders across the country soon came in attacking Soderstrom, demanding he explain himself. The letter from Upholsters’ International Union First Vice-President Alfred Rota of Philadelphia was one such example. He begins by claiming impartiality, criticizing not the comments themselves as much as his decision to make such statements without sanction from the AL-CIO leadership:

I think, Rube, you have jumped the gun, because no one knows yet who the AFL-CIO is going to endorse, if any one. At least you could have waited until the “Chiefs of the AFL-CIO” had an opportunity to decide on what the Labor Movement as a whole is going to decide to do. A good soldier does not go over the heads of his Generals. You should know that because of your position as President of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, which you have held many, many years, you have always expected loyalty and cooperation from your fellow officers on the Executive Board.

I know that you have been a Republican, but I should think that your first loyalty should be to the Labor Movement…I happen also to be a registered Republican and have been since 1917, but I vote for the man, not the Party, and in my position I would not dare, at least at this early date, not knowing all the facts, to make such a statement…

As Rota continues, however, it soon becomes clear that his concerns are primarily partisan, as he worries of the impact of Reub’s words on the chances of Kennedy’s election in such a close race:

It might be true, as you say, that Senator Johnson’s record is “bad, bad, bad, thoroughly bad,” but it certainly cannot be any worse than Nixon’s, who is running for President, while Senator Johnson will only be Vice President.

The impression you leave with anyone who does not know any better is that they should vote for Nixon, and a worse candidate, as far as labor is concerned, could not be chosen…it would be very damaging to the welfare of the workers, if they took you literally, and because of it would vote for Nixon, and we would lose any votes on that account. I think we will need all the votes we can get in order to change the National Administration.

Despite his assertion that (unlike Reuben) his first loyalty is to the Labor Movement, Rota ultimately reveals that he is more than willing to accept an anti-labor Vice President if it can help the Democratic nominee’s chances:

If, because of the choosing of Senator Johnson as Vice-President, Senator Kennedy can win next November, the fact that Johnson will be Vice-President will not in any way hurt labor as a whole…It is better to have a Democratic President, even though we may not like or agree on the Vice-President, than to have reactionary Nixon for President and a Vice-President of unknown quantity as far as labor is concerned.

In his closing, Rota essentially accuses Reuben of treachery, putting party and politics before labor and duty:

Well, the damage, whatever it amounts to, is done, and you cannot undo it. At least the others who were present, had sense enough not to commit themselves and apparently did not agree with your statement. We must be Union Leaders first and Republicans and Democrats second. It should be the man we vote for and elect, if he is a friend of Labor, whether we are Republicans or Democrats. We have our first obligation to the members we represent. We are supposed to lead them, not betray them.[34]

Alfred’s critique, echoed by many in labor, was full of passion and obviously motivated by a genuine desire to do what was in labor’s best interests. However, his misunderstanding of what Reuben was trying to accomplish in his remarks was indicative of the growing problem labor was facing in the political arena—a problem Soderstrom was actively trying to counter. Despite their protests to the contrary, Rota and those he represented had clearly lost the ability to distinguish between Democratic interests and Labor interests. This had lost them leverage within the Democratic Party coalition, so much so that a Democratic-controlled Senate and House could by 1960 pass anti-labor legislation like the Landrum-Griffin bill without fear of reprisal. The Party’s decision to put an anti-labor candidate only one heartbeat from the Presidency was, in Reuben’s eyes, merely the strongest sign yet of Labor’s capture. As Rota himself made clear, he and those like him were willing to endure these abuses out of a fear of the alternative—a fear that had left the movement dangerously impotent.

This short-sightedness also rendered those like Rota unable to embrace the alternative, namely transforming the Republican Party. This is exactly what Soderstrom was seeking to encourage through his comments at the Rockefeller dinner. Reuben’s comments were likely not spontaneous; in his estimation, the Democratic Party needed a wake-up call, and Reub was determined to send them one. As the 1960 political season got underway, he watched with intense interest, looking for an opportunity to publicly prod the Democratic Party, and the Johnson nomination coupled with Rockefeller’s outreach provided the perfect opportunity. Nelson Rockefeller represented the moderate-to-liberal wing of the Republican Party; it was so closely identified with him that all moderate Republicans would later be derisively labeled by their enemies as “Rockefeller Republicans.” At the time of Reub’s comments, and as Soderstrom described in his response to Rota, “My comment was made before the Republicans had made their choice of top candidates. I was hoping that Nelson Rockefeller would be favorably considered – which he wasn’t so both parties certainly let labor down with respect to producing a progressive ticket.” But even if the Republicans failed to change today, Reuben argued, there was value in dissent, in refusing to simply accept the party line. He continued:

But a little display of dissatisfaction may pass the Forand bill, the jobsite picketing bill, the increase in the minimum wage bill in the August session of Congress. This would give these candidates a recent labor record to bring before the people in the fall campaign. It is too much to hope that Congress in the August session will repeal the Hobbs bill, the Lea bill, the Knowland amendment, the Taft-Hartley law, the Landrum-Griffin bill, which all four candidates have helped to place on the statute books.

Reuben flatly refuted the charge that he was putting partisanship first. Had Rota known the first thing about Soderstrom, he would likely never have advanced the charge. After all, though nominally a Republican, Reub had begun his political life as a Bull-Moose Progressive, and had been one of President Roosevelt’s most ardent supporters, a far stronger advocate than the more conservative AFL leadership had been. He also reaffirmed that he would ultimately follow the AFL leadership, although he made clear his opinion:

I have never cared very much whether a candidate calls himself a Republican or Democrat, so long as he is friendly to labor…Please know that I’ll support whoever is recommended by George Meany and the Executive Council—although under existing conditions it could well be that no recommendation will be made. It will depend, no doubt, upon what happens in the August session of Congress.

In all, Reuben’s response to Rota is surprisingly even-tempered, even conciliatory, given the nature and tone of the accusations. This is perhaps in part to deescalate the situation; after all, Reuben’s attempt to influence the Republican ticket had failed, and while the attack on Reub’s loyalties were wildly out of bounds, the accusation that he had acted without the approval of national leadership carried greater potential for blowback. Still, Reuben ends his missive with a little bite:

Sincerely thanking you for your letter and trusting that lack of critical comment and complacency will not convince our U.S. Senators and Congressmen that nothing needs to be done by them in the August session of Congress, I am with every personal good wish,

Your friend,
R.G. Soderstrom President[35]

Reuben Rejects Democratic Partisanship

While national in scope, the Johnson/Rota episode was far from the only battle Reuben would fight for labor’s political soul in 1960. The next one, in fact, would land much closer to home. In August of 1960, the Illinois State AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) met to discuss the coming general election. It was the first time the AFL and CIO would make a joint endorsement; in 1956, the then-unmerged organizations had made rival endorsements—the ISFL supported the Republican Stratton, while the CIO backed his Democratic rival. Reuben had worked hard back then, overcoming strong opposition within his own ranks to secure the endorsement, and he was confident he could do so once again.

However, there were new challenges to overcome. Previously, political endorsements were settled by the ISFL Executive Committee, a small body Reub could easily influence. Under the terms of the merger, however, these decisions were made by the newly-established Illinois COPE, a committee composed of the state board of directors and 25 congressional district representatives, nearly 100 members in all. Moreover, many of those representatives were former CIO men, skeptical of a nonpartisan agenda and committed to a “realignment,” a strategy that author Max Green described as:

[A fight] to realign the Democratic Party, to move with civil rights and liberal forces against the Southerners and machine politicians who had checked the party’s liberal impulses. That is, it was attempting to transform the ideologically diverse Democratic Party into a party with a liberal ideology.[36]

Despite some early success in fending off these efforts during the primaries, Soderstrom was unable to stop these forces from forcing a straight-line Democratic endorsement. He dissented strongly, encouraging his peers to think about the implications of their actions—all to no avail. For the first time in the post-war era, Illinois union leaders backed every Democrat on the state ticket. The press coverage of the announcement was just as Soderstrom had predicted and feared; newspapers across the state ran headlines like “Unions for Democrats in Illinois” and “Unions Back State Demos,” destroying any semblance of labor’s non-partisanship.[37]

The biggest endorsement—and the one that the papers greeted with the greatest interest—was the backing of Democratic gubernatorial candidate Otto Kerner over incumbent William Stratton. The incumbent Governor, seeking an unprecedented third term, was known as a political ally of the Illinois AFL-CIO President. From the outset of the COPE meeting, Reuben had sought diplomatic alternatives to outright endorsement, initially gaining some traction with the idea of endorsing both Stratton and his Democratic rival Otto Kerner.[38] The Chicago-based Cook County COPE, however, would have none of it. They were determined to deliver labor’s support fully to the Democratic Party. The best Reuben could do in the end was insert language into the final draft of the official endorsement that obliquely acknowledged the Governor’s past support, as well as Soderstrom’s regret:

We sincerely regret that we cannot recommend every one of the incumbents who seek re-election. Many of these incumbents have been helpful on some measure, but their over-all record falls short of our modest yardstick for recommendation. We thank them for the help they did extend.[39]

Soderstrom Confronts Hostile Convention

The snubbing of Stratton didn’t stop there. That October, Governor Stratton was invited to speak at the annual Illinois AFL-CIO convention, as was the tradition for a sitting Governor. This time, however, the experience was quite different. According to press accounts, the Republican governor was met with a chilly reception. It started to go off the rails when, at the start of his speech, Stratton gave Reuben his high praise, stating Soderstrom and Vice President Stanley Johnson had helped place Illinois among states “in which laws pertaining to labor are progressive, well-balanced and non-restrictive.” When he paused for the usual applause, however, he was met with a deafening silence. Visibly shaken, the Governor turned to Soderstrom and half-jokingly said “I thought that would get a hand, Rube.”[40]

It only got worse from there. He was booed eight times during his 20-minute speech. After the sweaty Governor mercifully left the stage, Reuben stormed up to the podium. Brimming with anger, he chided the delegates responsible for the booing, sternly telling them “This is not a political meeting! Booing and catcalls are bad manners. The governor gave us one of the best speeches I’ve ever heard. He’s been a good governor.”[41]

When Reuben said this, something that had never occurred in his 30 years of leadership happened—Soderstrom was booed! Stanley Johnson came to Reub’s defense, joining in the condemnation of the delegates’ behavior. “Never before in the house of labor have I seen such disrespect to a visitor!” he declared.

The spectacle continued. US Secretary of Labor Mitchell followed the Governor, again tempting the ire of the raucous crowd. As he gave his speech, the sea of Democratic Campaign buttons he saw in the crowd below prompted the Eisenhower man to defensively claim “I am here as your secretary of labor, not as a partisan.”[42] When he ended his speech, several delegates unfurled a banner reading “This is Nixon’s GOP prosperity. International Harvester to shut 12 plants. No Thanksgiving turkeys for 25,000 families.” As the Decatur Herald reported, “One such banner was displayed in front of the speaker’s stand until Soderstrom pounded his gavel and declared ’Get that thing out of here!”[43]

The affair was a complete debacle, and the press reported it with breathless glee. Rumors flew accusing the former CIO leadership of attempting (and potentially succeeding at) a labor coup. Many whispered that the aging President was too weak, physically as well as politically, to carry on. The hardest-hitting coverage came from the Chicago American, which published an article entitled “Chaos Hits State Parley of the AFL-CIO,” in which it painted the picture of an organization at the brink of civil war. It quoted anonymous sources calling the convention “disgusting and disgraceful. If the UAW ends up running the Illinois Labor movement, the Building Trades and the rest of the AFL unions are going to take a walk and George Meany can go to hell for himself…The lousiest saloon in the State is a better place to be than a ‘Red’ convention.” The CA ended its piece claiming “the very existence of the AFL-CIO is threatened.”[44] It was not an unfair observation; on the eve of the closest election in 12 years, increasing political tensions appeared ready to tear the toddling Illinois AFL-CIO apart.

Unity and Loyalty Demanded

Soderstrom had had enough. He could tolerate some degree of dissension, and had already endured his share of rejection, but he would suffer no mutiny. It was time to put his house in order, but to do so Reuben realized a simple silencing of the opposition from within his ranks would not suffice. He needed a clear show of unanimous support, not only of labor’s agenda but of his leadership. If labor was to retain its influence, there had to be no doubt in the minds of labor’s friends and enemies as to who spoke for her. Reub needed a public show of fealty, and he would have it.

The next morning, Reuben’s AFL-CIO Resolutions Committee introduced two resolutions. The first, “United We Stand,” reaffirmed the indivisible nature of the AFL-CIO union. It explicitly compared the struggle between the two former organizations to the American Civil War before concluding “Those were troublesome times, much like our present times…we are trying to keep our own ‘Union’ united and strong, for ‘United we stand, divided we fall.’”[45] The second resolution was a salute to Reuben for his 30 thirty years of leadership, a glowing tribute which read in part:

We could recite volumes of the good performed by this kindly, fighting advocate of justice and decency for all. His particular fondness for helping poor and needy people has run through his whole life of fifty active years as a trade unionist. We salute Reuben G. Soderstrom for the last thirty years devoted to making this State Organization the respected powerful body it is. We say thanks for a job well done.[46]

To introduce the resolution the committee selected Joe Germano, the former President of the Illinois CIO himself. A dutiful soldier, Germano threw his full support behind Soderstrom’s leadership and called on his former CIO members to do the same. “There are those who want to destroy the AFL-CIO,” Germano warned, and they were the ones responsible for any rumors of dissent.[47] He acknowledged their split over some political issues but denied any allegation that they were at odds, telling the crowd “There may have been times when we did not see eye-to-eye on certain things, but this should not have been interpreted as meaning that he has not been a great labor leader.[48]” After this public disavowal of rebellion, CIO man Germano reaffirmed his loyalty to AFL man Reuben, promising to support Soderstrom as long as he remained head of the state AFL-CIO:

I have known Reuben Soderstrom probably longer than many of the delegates assembled at this great convention. He has been a friend of mine, and I of his, for many, many years. We have had high regard and respect for one another. I want to say in my opinion he has been an outstanding labor leader. This tribute paid to Brother Soderstrom this morning is a small token of appreciation for the work he has done, not only for the labor movement he has had the privilege to represent, but for the people of the great state of Illinois, and I know it to be a fact that his contribution to the labor movement did not only start and end in the state of Illinois, but because of his judgment in the higher circles of the national labor movement, his judgment and opinions have been recognized and put into effect…

I have always respected and loved Reuben Soderstrom, and I shall continue to respect and love him. I shall quarrel with him when I think I must, and I hope that Reuben Soderstrom shall continue to lead us for many, many years to come. And I hope all those who agree with me will please rise to your feet and approve this Resolution.[49]

The assembly approved the resolution with loud applause as Reuben rose to the stage. He stood before a cheering crowd that had only yesterday been a moody throng, using the moment to show both press and peers that labor would not collapse under its own weight—it was and would remain a house united. Taking the podium, he told all in attendance:

Friends, words always seem inadequate when one is called upon to respond to a tribute as fine as the one just paid to me. I want to thank every delegate for arranging this lovely program in my honor. It is a great privilege to be permitted to officially represent the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and I want to say to you, in all humility, I feel highly honored and highly privileged to be permitted to speak for this great organization. I will never be able to tell you how much I appreciate the opportunity to be of service.

I have been blessed with wonderful help and a great deal of energy and despite my advancing years, I am still able to carry on my official duties in a fairly satisfactory way. In the event I find I am slipping somewhat in the future, I will be glad to resign. I will do it willingly. No one will need to push me out.

Thirty years ago when I first became president, the future looked somewhat bright then. I think it looks even brighter today. And with your help and with the help of our heavenly father, I think we can face the future unafraid.[50]

The tightly-orchestrated display of unity worked. No further articles were published pushing rumors of labor rebellion. Instead, Soderstrom received editorial praise for his conduct during the affair. “It is to the credit of Reuben G. Soderstrom, state AFL president, that he chided the delegates for their bad manners,” the Decatur Daily Review noted.[51] The Streator Times Press concluded:

The overwhelming vote of confidence given R.G. Soderstrom as president of the Illinois AFL-CIO at its annual meeting in Springfield this week is pleasing news to Reub’s host of friends and neighbors here. Soderstrom has headed the state organization for thirty years, demonstrating his devotion to the cause of labor and winning success as an able administrator. His service may be measured by the achievements recorded. Wise in his counsel and skilled at the bargaining table he has proven effective, possible also because of the confidence he has of his fellow workers and the respect he has gained at the hands of management. The little flurry exhibited at Springfield does not represent the thinking nor will it have the endorsement of the union members generally throughout Illinois. Out of the experience, he emerges stronger than before.[52]

Reuben had spent the year fighting fervently to keep labor endeared to both parties, but clearly the groundswell toward Democratic alignment occurred under his very feet. It was just the start of a tumultuous decade, and only time would tell if Reuben could in fact keep labor moving into the progressive and bipartisan future he’d spent a lifetime dreaming of.

In November, John F. Kennedy and his running mate Lyndon B. Johnson won the presidential election. In Illinois, Republican William Stratton lost the governorship.

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