THE SUMMER OF DISCONTENT

“The legislative program is not a two-man show, Reub!”[1]

Robert Johnston was through negotiating. It wasn’t just the oppressive August heat or the tiny, sweaty conference room they’d been packed in for hours. It wasn’t even the stress of the calendar, with less than a month to go before their planned joint merger conference. After two years, three constitutional drafts, and twenty rounds, the Regional Director of the United Auto Workers (UAW) simply couldn’t take any more. He wasn’t alone; as the 21st meeting of the Illinois State Merger Committee wore on, Johnston and his CIO compatriots, clearly exasperated, refused to speak another word of compromise. They had wrung support from their board, he bemoaned, only by promising there would be no further concessions. CIO President Joe Germano chimed in, nearly shouting at President Soderstrom and his Secretary-Treasurer Stanley Johnson:

I’ve quarreled with my own Board, and presented the last draft with the idea that not one word would be changed. Our Executive Board was very unhappy with the draft, but we set our foot down and said we wanted the merger…We don’t see how we can go any further…We can’t go back to our Executive Board or to Convention and propose anything other than the latest draft which we tentatively agreed on![2]

But Joe wasn’t the only official who had to answer to his board. Just four days earlier Reub and Stanley had brought the draft to their own executives, who were just as dubious of it as Germano’s men. They balked at the idea of creating the office of Executive Vice-President especially for the CIO, and their insistence on replacing the short, traditional ISFL Weekly Newsletter with yet another attempt at their own failed, full-blown (and expensive) CIO newspaper. They deeply resented being asked by the broke upstart organization to take on what they saw as unnecessary full-time staff and the CIO’s “rule by committee” approach to governance. As ISFL Vice President and former Secretary-Treasurer Earl McMahon put it, “I don’t know why these [CIO] people with no money feel they can tell us that this is what we will have to take!”[3]

The ISFL executive board’s greatest concern, however, was the question of how to handle the politics of Springfield. For the board, this struck at the heart of the Federation. According to the ISFL constitution, “remedial and beneficial labor legislation is the aim, purpose, and objective of the Illinois State Federation of Labor.”[4] The ISFL had been wildly successful in this pursuit, as Reuben described in his Labor Day message the year before:

The Illinois State Federation of Labor is the wage earners’ organization in the legislative field. It is the most active and most successful State Federation in America…It is about time that the general public as well as all the Central Bodies and labor unions faced the fact that legislative accomplishments do not come by chance or by accident. They occur because the State Federation is on the job.[5]

Since the organization’s inception, this job had been the sacred duty of the President and his Secretary-Treasurer, who dedicated themselves each legislative session to advancing labor’s agenda. For decades, Reuben had been a fixture in the balconies of the Illinois House and Senate, watching every debate and tracking every vote. He had worked the assembly floors and capitol halls for 27 years, negotiating and building relationships with legislators, governors, and even the agents of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association. As former legislator, Soderstrom had proven extremely adroit, almost single-handedly building and defending a legacy that “produced a rich legislative harvest for our membership, and our families, and for the State and the Nation.”[6]

Now, however, the CIO wanted to replace this with a “legislative committee.” On the surface, the change sounded innocuous; Germano maintained “we’re not trying to take away from the activities of the President and the Secretary-Treasurer in Springfield. The President and the Executive Board would run the show.”[7] As the negotiations continued, however, it became increasingly clear that they intended the (presumably CIO-dominated) Committee, not Soderstrom, to have ultimate control. In the words of Regional Director Johnston:

The Legislative Committee would be the group which implements the program in Springfield. The legislative program is not a two-man show. The two officers can’t violate the program and strategy established by the Legislative Committee…The Legislative Committee will set out the policy, strategy, etc…it will also be on the scene to assist in carrying out the program.[8]

Reub and Stanley immediately tore apart this idea. The president and his Secretary-Treasurer needed flexibility, Johnson stressed, and couldn’t be constantly checking in with some part-time, far-flung committee. Johnston shot back that they would simply force the committee to stay in Springfield full-time during the session. How could that work, Soderstrom pressed, when most of the people with the experience to serve on this Committee had full-time jobs of their own outside of Springfield? Germano answered that if someone without the ability to be in Springfield, like himself, were elected to the Committee, he would appoint his own representative to sit in his place. Robert agreed, adding “If I were on the committee I would appoint my own legislative representative to sit on the committee. He would be responsible to me first.”[9]

That’s when Reuben struck. Everyone with even a cursory understanding of the political process knew full well that no committee run by proxy could ever be knowledgeable, effective, or timely enough to be taken seriously in Springfield. Political negotiations depended on trust, which in turn rested on authority. If Reuben’s every move had to be challenged or approved by committee, nothing would ever get accomplished in a legislative session. Anyone with doubts about that had only to look at these very talks for an instructive example of what negotiation by committee looked like! As for oversight, the constitution already empowered the executive board to formulate the details of the legislative program.

Reuben knew his wasn’t about workers’ best interests. This was about control; about the power of individual committee members to shape policy and prevent any deals they deemed distasteful to their own constituency, even at the expense of labor as a whole. Soderstrom was willing to compromise. He could accept a legislative committee, even if he found it redundant, but he must have the authority to stop personal agendas from getting in the way of workers’ needs. In Springfield, labor would speak with only one voice.

The CIO, however, was in no mood for concessions. “We reviewed the new proposals,” said United Packinghouse Workers President and CIO negotiator Charles Hayes. “Our Executive Board rejected them and approved the third draft. We can’t go beyond that.”[10] Bob Johnston agreed, telling Reub, “It would be useless for us at this time to discuss changing specific language when there are fundamental issues involved.” And with that they marched out of the meeting, refusing to hear another word. The message was clear—the CIO would not stomach the ISFL’s “two man show” in Springfield. If the ISFL wanted unity, it would be on the terms of the third draft, or there would be no merger.

Soderstrom was furious. He stormed out of the hall straight into a crowd of waiting reporters. When an investigator for the Daily News asked for an update, Reub, filled with anger, said exactly what was on his mind. The next day CIO officials woke up to public reports that they had walked away from the negotiating table. It wasn’t long before ISFL attorney Lester Asher received a call from his CIO counterpart, Abe Brussell, complaining:

The CIO is irritated because…these press releases violated the agreement that no statements were to be issued unless in writing and signed by Soderstrom and Germano. Soderstrom had in the past violated this agreement, but had promised not to do so again. The statements…particularly irritated them and put the CIO Merger Committee in a bad light.[11]

The CIO Committee, Brussell continued, had held a meeting and decided to reaffirm their refusal to accept or even negotiate on any of the ISFL’s proposed changes. The talks, he said, were dead.

The stakes couldn’t be any higher. The national AFL and CIO had merged over a year ago, and national President George Meany was fast losing patience. He didn’t care about details or disagreements surrounding the merger, only that it get done. In an uncharacteristically cold letter, Meany bluntly told Soderstrom that if the Illinois Federation and CIO failed to merge by the year’s end, he was authorized and willing to revoke the charters of both the Illinois CIO and ISFL and create a new, merged organization—presumably one without Reuben as president.[12] Germano, who would resign his presidency in any event, knew full well that Soderstrom had far more to lose, and seemed ready to carry this game of brinksmanship to the bitter end. Reub was at a dangerous crossroads: should he surrender legislative control to an ineffectual committee, putting his entire legacy in jeopardy? Or would he risk the dissolution of the very organization he’d spent 27 years working so hard to build? Either way, his life’s work hung in the balance.

LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

Rep. Carl Soderstrom Helps Firemen and Teachers

The start of 1957 held little hint of the worries to come, however. As the 70th session of the Illinois General Assembly got underway, Reuben and his son Carl were far more immediately concerned with pushing forward on labor’s agenda than they were with the merger. For Carl, this effort began with unfinished business—passing the Firemen’s Hours Bill that the governor had killed two years earlier. Carl re-introduced the previously defeated legislation, which would limit the number of hours a fireman could be worked to 56; at present, may smaller cities, including Streator, were forcing their poor protectors to work as many as 84 hours per week. Despite a heavily Republican legislature (38 Republicans to 20 Democrats in the Senate, 94 to 83 in the House) the political landscape had shifted in his favor since the last session.[13] As his hometown paper noted:

When Stratton vetoed the bill affecting cities over 12,000 population two years ago, he said local authorities should make the decision because their circumstances varied. Then the 1955 Legislature gave cities the authority to set up a one-half cent city sales tax. When the lawmakers were debating the last 56-hour week proposal, cities did not have this authority.[14]

Carl’s bill sailed through its House committee hearing, with only one vote against it.[15] A few weeks later it scored another crushing victory, passing the full House by a vote of 146 to 1.[16] It subsequently sailed through the Senate and was signed by the Governor on June 7, 1957, making the bill one of the most popular pieces of legislation that session.[17] While most of its effect wouldn’t be felt until after the 1960 census, firemen across the state could now look forward to the end of the unrelenting 24-hour on, 24-hour off schedules that had run them ragged. The bill also brought new jobs, with the cities of Carbondale, Marion, Murphysboro and Herrin all making plans to expand their firefighting forces.[18] Even Carl’s Streator hired two new firemen in the wake of the new law.[19]

Carl also went to work on a new version of his Teachers’ Minimum Wage Bill. Like before, Carl sought to replace the existing graduated standards, which set different starting wages anywhere from $1,200 to $2,600 depending on level of education, with a flat minimum. This time, however, he made an even more audacious proposal, calling for a new flat rate of $3,600, a full 20% more than the increase he’d called for the year before.[20] As with his Firemen’s Bill, Carl was able to secure an overwhelming number of votes for his measure; it passed the House by a vote of 112 to 11.[21] Powerful interests in the Senate, however, defeated the measure in the educational committee, ensuring that no Senator would be seen voting against better pay for teachers.

Undaunted, the younger Soderstrom teamed with fellow pro-labor Republican Sen. Crisenberry to again present a modified bill. While it kept the graduated system in place, it significantly closed the pay gap; under the new system non-degreed teachers would start at $3,200 (as much as a 167% increase) while those with a bachelor’s degree would start at $3,400. Crisenberry’s bill passed the Senate, marking another major success for Soderstrom. From Chester to West Frankfort to Royalton, teachers across Illinois could now look forward to reasonable salaries, especially in grade schools.[22]

Carl’s legislative victories helped to solidify his standing as a powerful pro-labor politician. A glowing profile in his hometown paper detailed his accomplishments on the eve of his re-election announcement:

Representative Soderstrom is serving his fourth term in the General Assembly and holds the responsible position of vice chairman of the powerful House Committee on Judiciary, a committee made up of attorney members of the House. He is also a member of three other important committees, namely Appropriations, Education and Executive. In the last session of the legislature he gave special attention to the needs of former soldiers, sportsmen, educators, wage-earners, business people, farmers, and to the numerous highway and other problems of concern to the citizenry of the 38th Representative District.[23]

The Minimum Wage and the Rise of the IFRA

While Carl worked on better minimum wages for teachers, his father was busy fighting for a minimum wage for all. The last few years had been unquestionably good for laborers in Illinois. A new study released that January showed that factory workers had attained the average rate of $2.00 per hour. As Reub noted with some satisfaction in a speech before the Central Labor Conference that year:

To me there is a good deal of encouragement in the government’s announcement…A lot of reactionaries who used to argue against $1 an hour wages as “too high” and “inflationary” are going to take off again with a new propaganda blast. First of all, the $2 average is good so far as it goes, but as workers’ families know pretty well, $2 an hour can go pretty fast—as a matter of fact even a $2 wage brings an annual income less than that recommended by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for minimum decency levels for a typical American family of four. Secondly, the low wage philosophers ought to remember that families without decent incomes can’t buy the products of American factories and farms.[24]

While much of the national focus was on the national average, Rueben remained concerned about those who struggled most. As Soderstrom noted in his Central Labor speech, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics had found that $2.00 per hour was not enough to raise a family. While in 1957 there was no firm consensus as to what the “poverty line” actually was (the Eisenhower Administration had for years revised down the Congressional figures, which themselves hadn’t been properly updated since 1949), there was an established federal minimum wage of $1.00 per hour.[25] This wage, however, only applied to workers employed in industries engaged in interstate commerce, leaving more than 200,000 Illinois workers completely unprotected (compared to the 50,000 that were covered by the federal standard).[26] In the absences of a universal national minimum, states such as Rhode Island and Massachusetts had passed their own state wage laws.[27] Reuben was convinced that Illinois should do likewise. In the last General Assembly he had overseen the introduction of two bills establishing a minimum wage of 75 cents an hour (with different exemptions), only to see them both fail in the closing week of the legislature.[28]

This time he returned to Springfield twice as determined. He had both bills re-introduced (with his son as a co-sponsor to both).[29] This time, however, he had two additional advantages. First was the introduction of a third bill setting an even higher rate of 90 cents the following week, giving Reuben the opportunity to present his option as a “moderate” alternative.[30] Second was the full weight and support of the governor’s office. Gov. Stratton, already supportive of the previous legislation, had this time—at Reub’s request—fully adopted one of the two measures, with the press now referring to it as “Governor Stratton’s minimum wage proposal.”[31] Now, to oppose the bill meant not only going against Illinois workers; it meant defying the Republican administration.

Despite all this support and pressure, the bill failed to receive its first formal hearing before the nefarious House Committee on Industry and Labor Relations until March 27. Reuben and CIO legislative operative John Alesia both gave testimony in support of the bill. Although their arguments were reasoned and strong, they faced a wily opponent in Joseph Meek. After failing to unseat Paul Douglas in the 1954 Senate race, the former editor of the Illinois Journal of Commerce and President of the American Association of Retail Executives had reinvented himself in 1957 by founding the Illinois Federation of Retail Associations (IFRA), a new organization he hoped would rival both Reub’s ISFL and the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association as a power player in Illinois policy and politics. Meek claimed that allowing any minimum wage would threaten small business and force them to fire workers. Despite Meek’s best efforts and what Reub referred to as “the usual turmoil” of delays and quorum calls, the Committee favorably reported out both minimum wage bills on April 3.[32]

Though Soderstrom had prevailed in the House, he faced a now all-too familiar set of dirty tricks in the Senate, particularly in the Committee on Industrial Affairs. In a scheme Soderstrom described as a “committee shell game,” Chairman Senator Scott first cancelled and then shifted the location of the bill’s hearing in violation of Senate rules in an effort to exclude all supportive testimony. As Soderstrom detailed:

It was announced by Chairman Scott that his Industrial Affairs Committee would meet in Room M-1 immediately following the meeting to be held by the Public Welfare Committee. Labor representatives, who wanted to testify for the Minimum Wage Bill, sat through the hearing of the Public Welfare Committee waiting. However, when this group adjourned there was no sign of Chairman Scott and his Industrial Affairs Committee Members.

A wee bit puzzled and a little suspicious that labor representatives were not wanted at the Industrial Affairs Committee session, the two major officers of the Illinois State Federation of Labor walked out of Room M-1 and opened the door of the committee room next door, and lo and behold, there were Chairman Scott and his Industrial Affairs Committee in session. All the heads of the Illinois Retail Federation and Illinois Manufacturers’ Association down to the not-so-prominent reactionaries who serve these anti-union combines. Their numbers were accentuated by the fact that there was not a single labor representative present.[33]

This was a new low, even by Illinois Senate standards. By excluding labor testimony, Meek, Scott, and the rest hoped not only to persuade any undecided Senators but to provide cover when the governor and the press inevitably demanded to know why one of his bills had been refuted by his own party—a huge political embarrassment. If there was no testimony in support of the measure on the record, blame could reasonably fall on the administration, not the scheming Senate. Reuben swiftly took to the pages of his Weekly Newsletter to shine light on the tactics:

The vanishing committee shell game is a new piece of legislative skullduggery…Causing committee meetings to disappear, or to hide them, is a violation of the rules, and it is to be hoped that the practice will not be repeated. Chairman Scott performed a great disservice to the Governor who favored the proposal; to (Republican) Majority Leader John Lewis who sponsored the bill; and to the representatives of labor who were seeking an opportunity to properly testify for the measure.[34]

Despite his anger, there was little Reuben could do. Meek and his new Retail Federation, it seemed, had won this round; Soderstrom would have to wait for the rematch he so desperately craved.

Anti-Picketing Legislation

Although Soderstrom suffered setbacks in his legislative agenda, he was still able to check his opponents’ maneuvers, defeating several anti-labor bills. Chief among these was the Anti-Picketing Bill, a Chamber of Commerce-backed piece of legislation that Reub described as “a union-busting, strike-breaking bill which is designed to prohibit picketing.”[35] Introduced by Representative Widmer, the proposed legislation sought to undo Reuben’s signature achievement by amending his 1926 Injunction Limitation Act, allowing courts to issue injunctions against unions peacefully picketing outside businesses in an attempt to organize their workers.

Reuben believed the bill to be clearly unconstitutional, acting in direct violation of the US Supreme Court Swing Case ruling that picketing was a constitutionally protected form of free speech—a case Soderstrom himself successfully had pushed from Illinois to the nation’s highest court. Still, he feared its passage could do serious damage to labor in Illinois if it was allowed to stay in place during a prolonged and costly court challenge.

Reuben wasted no time. He knew that the mainstream press, with its penchant for sensationalism and love of labor corruption stories, would likely embrace the measure. Widmer himself played into the media bias, describing his legislation as “not an anti-labor bill but an anti-racketeering bill” that would stop unscrupulous unions unwanted by workers, breathlessly telling the press “small businessmen are the helpless prey of labor unions.”[36] While acknowledging the reality of corruption, Reub responded by challenging the narrative:

The statement is made and published and editorialized by the daily press of widespread abuses of picketing…remember, newspapers today are not newspapers at all. They are commercial institutions and their claim that organizational picketing is widespread is absolutely false. An occasional abuse has occurred. So do occasional abuses in government, banking, medical, and business practices. Labor flatly opposes legislation designed to destroy legitimate functions of any group because of an abuse. The cure should not be permitted to kill the patient.[37]

Reub wrote to the governor to gain his support, telling him, “Undoubtedly you will be called upon by some members of the General Assembly for an opinion with respect to your attitude relative to House Bill No. 702. I sincerely trust you will find it consistent and agreeable to support the very definite decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”[38] He likewise published a call-to-arms to all labor secretaries and delegates, asking them to “Please write a nice letter immediately to your three State Representatives urging them to vote against this oppressive measure…The right to picket peacefully is as essential as the right to strike. Both of these activities at odd times may hurt wage earners more than anyone else, but still these rights must never be surrendered because human freedom itself depends on their retention.[39]

Still, as the bill’s vote in the House Committee on Industry and Labor Relations neared, it remained uncertain whether Soderstrom would succeed. The Illinois Chamber of Commerce had lavished support on the bill, spending massive sums on promotional material to sway wavering legislators. Reub didn’t take any chances; he called on every labor representative he could find to pack the room, and organized more than a half dozen attorneys to testify on labor’s behalf. Reuben spearheaded the charge with a stirring speech, testifying with characteristic flair:

HB No. 702 is designed to circumvent the constitutional rights of free press and free speech with respect to wage-earners. It does not apply to all citizens. It does not apply to members of the Chambers of Commerce—

At the mention of the reviled organization, the crowd burst into deafening boos, nearly drowning out a very satisfied Reuben. Undaunted, he pressed forward, the room growing rowdier with each mention of their enemy’s name.

It only applies to working people and is an attempt to place wage-earners in a subordinate position…The Illinois Chamber of Commerce has been active, campaigning for this bill. The Chamber of Commerce has caused some literature to be placed on the desk of each lawmaker in the Illinois House of Representatives. This literature includes a pamphlet which contains editorials and newspaper articles which have been published in support of HB No. 702. In other words—the newspapers have been exercising their rights of free press and free speech abundantly and at the same time advocating the denial of these rights to working people!

With that the crowd erupted in applause in a raucous show of support. Reub continued, outlining the legislative and legal precedents for his case, from the creation of his injunction-limitation act over 30 years earlier to the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of labor’s rights in the Swing case. Then, with typical rhetorical ease he moved to the heart of his attack:

It seems strange that in a democratic republic such as the United States, the question “What are the rights of wage-earners?” should arise or even be discussed. Yet in the provisions of HB No. 702 and in order to comprehend fully the conditions created when a labor injunction is issued, it is necessary to emphasize these rights and elucidate them. The wage-earners’ rights are identical with their rights as citizens. Being a wage-earner neither decreases, increases, or in any other manner modifies or changes his citizen rights…Any action or legislation which interferes with these rights is un-American, as well as contrary to the Constitution…

Injunctions could be issued under HB No. 702 which would restrain workmen from peacefully picketing or inducting others to do that which otherwise has been deemed lawful to do; restrain working people from peacefully communicating information; from peaceful assembling; from enjoying the rights of association; from the enjoyment of free locomotion; from the right to quit work and pay strike benefits; from the right to free speech and free press. Any attempt on the part of workmen enjoined from the exercise of these fundamental and constitutional rights would be held to be in contempt and subject to punishment according to the judge’s conscience.

The labor injunction is the weapon of industrial tyrants. It’s the weapon of autocrats because violation of it permits no trial by jury. The judge demands obedience; failure to obey is construed to be contempt of court. A violator of an injunction can be fined and jailed. There is no trial. There is no appeal…And I say to you, my friends, that there never was a tyrant on the face of the earth but what he could find some judge or some court willing to cloak tyranny in the forms of law and legality. Pass legislation like HB No. 702 and the court becomes the tool of industrial oppressors. It no longer can administer equal justice. HB No. 702 should not be permitted to advance out of the hearing stage.[40]

Reub got his wish. The anti-picketing bill was turned down by the House committee by a vote of 26 to 15.

Undeterred, Representative Widmer vowed to have the whole House reject the disapproval and bring the measure to the House floor.[41] It was the audience, he whined, that had doomed the measure. He cited Representative Marion Burk’s testimony that “the members of this committee will vote against their own conscience because they have been intimidated by labor.”[42] Widmer echoed the charge, claiming legislators “were under pressure to vote against the bill because of mass booing by union representatives who attended the hearing.”[43]

Widmer’s second round against Reub failed even more miserably than his first. Reporter Raymond Coffey described the scene:

The House galleries were filled with opponents and supporters of the bill as the vote was taken on Widmer’s motion, and the hour and a half debate was punctuated several times with cheers and boos…Widmer charged that such “racket picketing” tends to “eliminate many small businesses that cannot withstand the pressure” of picketing…He and other supporters of the bill made several references to the current U.S. Senate Rackets Committee investigation of Dave Beck and the Teamsters Union… Rep. G. William Horsley (R. Springfield) said the bill was sponsored “by the Chamber of Commerce’ and would make it possible for employers to forever avoid picketing of their establishments by firing enough workers to prevent a union from ever representing a majority…Rep. Carl Soderstrom (R. Streator), a son of Illinois Federation of Labor President Reuben G. Soderstrom, said the bill would ‘revive union busting by injunction.”[44]

The vote was overwhelming; 28 Republicans joined nearly all the Democrats to defeat Widmer’s second attempt by 104-64. The vote was so commanding that it doomed not only the anti-picketing bill but all other anti-labor legislation for the year as well, including a new, vicious “right to work” bill.[45] By the close of the legislative session Reub proclaimed relief as well as victory, telling the labor faithful:

The end of the 1957 session of the Illinois General Assembly was welcomed with a sigh of relief. It came on June 30 and with emotions, tempers, and feelings returning to normal, the windup was as soothing as a cool breeze after a terrifically hot day. Six months of excitement, clashing and tension experienced by lawmakers, legislative representatives, and individual citizens interested in the actions of the legislative branch of our State government faded away into an atmosphere of tolerance and friendship when the sine die adjournment arrived.[46]

THE ILLINOIS AFL-CIO MERGER

Lester Asher Replaces Dan Carmell

Just as the legislative session was closing, a prickly nest of new problems opened up with respect to the pending merger of the Illinois Federation and the CIO’s Illinois Industrial Union Council. The two groups had spent all of 1956 and the first half of 1957 moving steadily—if slowly—towards crafting a final, agreed constitution ahead of their respective September conventions. They had managed to find acceptable compromises on many of the issues on which they had initially differed. The ISFL, for its part, had agreed in principle to continue the community service and farm worker outreach of the CIO (though they still disagreed on salaries). They also agreed to the CIO Committee system, allowing for the creation of a number of constitutional committees to oversee labor policy and approach on various issues. The CIO similarly accepted a minority position in the Executive Board, with 10 ISFL Vice Presidents to the CIO’s 7. Most importantly, both sides had engineered a compromise concerning the merged organization’s leadership; Reuben Soderstrom and Stanley Johnson would become President and Secretary-Treasurer of the new organization, while a new position—Executive Vice President—would be created and given to CIO Secretary-Treasurer Maurice McElligott.

Professionally, there was progress. Personal reconciliation, in contrast, remained more mixed. Although the Executive Vice President position had helped the CIO swallow Stanley’s role as Secretary-Treasurer, it didn’t make them any more trustful of him. Johnson furthered the problem, according to multiple CIO sources, by making repeated inflammatory and condescending remarks in meetings and in written correspondence. Most within the Industrial Union Council believed Stanley viewed the merger as, at best, a bitter pill he was forced to swallow.

Additional personalities further complicated the personal dynamic. CIO Vice President Robert Johnston of the UAW proved increasingly abrasive. Existing minutes and meeting summaries portray a man acting as more of an instigator than a negotiator, more interested in getting his way than in getting to a solution. No meeting participants made more threats, issued more ultimatums, or heard more of their own voices in these meetings than Johnston. He seemed to find the entire notion of merging highly disagreeable.

Charles Hayes was another CIO participant that argued hard, though for far more affirmative reasons. The pioneer organizer of the Packinghouse Workers was one of the most important voices in the Illinois civil rights movement. A future founder of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, Hayes was already helping raise funds for Martin Luther King Jr.’s efforts in the South; in these meetings his primary goal was ensuring that civil rights continue to receive the same attention in the merged organization they had in the CIO. In this he had the full and vocal backing of IIUC President Germano, who insisted that the Illinois labor constitution, like its national counterpart, contain a civil rights clause calling for nondiscrimination. He also wanted language forbidding Klu Klux Klan members from holding union posts.[47]

Unquestionably, the biggest personal upset the merger committee faced in 1957 was the loss of its longtime general counsel Dan Carmell. In 1956, the 58-year-old Carmell had been charged with transporting a 19-year-old Iowa woman to Chicago for “immoral purposes.”[48] In late January of 1957 the married father of two pleaded innocent before an Iowa Judge, posted a $5,000 bond and succeeded in having his trial moved to Chicago, all the while attempting to continue in his work. Still, Carmell appeared to fall into a deep depression as his court date neared.[49] The night before his trial was to begin, he sat with his wife, Mildred, watching TV as they did every Sunday evening. When their evening shows finished, Dan calmly got up and announced he was going to bed; Mildred went to the bathroom. Instead of preparing for bed, however, he quietly walked into the bedroom, opened up the window of their 15th story South Side apartment, and took a fateful step into the night air, plunging to his death in the early morning of June 3, 1957.[50]

The news hit Reuben like a punch to the gut. Of all the potential outcomes, this was one he had never foreseen. Carmell had spent years by his side. Outside of Victor Olander, no single person had earned Reub’s confidence the way Carmell had. He was the man Soderstrom picked to argue the Swing case before the U.S. Supreme Court, the man Reuben chose to act as the ISFL’s top attorney. As he had done too many times in recent years, he took to the pages of the ISFL Weekly Newsletter to eulogize his former companion:

The Illinois State Federation of Labor and the entire Illinois labor movement has lost one of the most practical and brilliant legal minds developed in the last quarter of a century. His passing leaves a void in the ranks of those who stand resolutely for the rights of wage earners and their unions…Dan Carmell was a man whose intellect and logic were used by dozens of unions for the benefit of the membership. His contacts in the legal, political, and union circles were legion…

We did not desert him when he was beset with difficulties. We felt confident that when his day in court ended, vindication would have been the order. We have wondered if his position and influence in union activities made him subject to harassment…We are dismayed by his tragic end. We cherish the memory of his accomplishments. We cast a mantle of forgiveness over his weaknesses…To his family, we extend our heartfelt sympathy. To them, our associates and ourselves, we only know that final judement has been reserved to and is now in the hands of the Supreme Ruler of us all.[51]

As Reuben alluded to in his obituary, there was (and remains) some suspicion that the charges, if not false, were at least uncovered or brought to court by anti-labor forces seeking to discredit Carmell and disrupt the ISFL. Like many in labor, Reuben believed that outside influence was possible, if not probable.

Carmell’s death put the Illinois Federation into a scramble. Attorney Lester Asher was bought in to replace Carmell in the merger negotiations. While his late entry put him and the ISFL at a clear disadvantage, Asher proved himself a quick and competent study. He also brought some valuable experience of his own, having helped write the constitution of the AFL Packing House Workers and CIO Meat Cutters after their merger in the summer of 1956. The experience left him with a clear suspicion of the CIO; as he told the ISFL Executive Board, “We found that unless everything was expressed clearly, they had interpretations contrary to our thinking. With the CIO, we could not deal with our usual good faith.”[52]

This, then, was the dynamic at play as the ISFL and IIUC entered the summer of 1957: two Presidents, Soderstrom and Germano, who were eager to find a solution but flanked by lieutenants, Johnson and Johnston, who were resistant to change and suspicious of each other. There was an alcoholic and mostly absent Secretary-Treasurer that the CIO insisted on placing in a top post even if it had to be invented for him, and a new attorney whose prior experience with the CIO had taught him to get every detail in writing, leaving nothing to chance. Before these men lay the vast existential task of defining the meaning and mission of the new Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of International Organizations. How broad would its new scope be? What purpose would it serve? In such tender negotiations as these, the mix of conflicting ideals and contrasting personalities would prove toxic.

Irreconcilable Differences

By July of that year attorneys Lester Asher and Abe Brussell had completed a third draft of the constitution that all parties felt came close to meeting both groups’ (begrudging) approval. Reuben even moved the 1957 ISFL conference from Peoria to Chicago in anticipation of a joint conference, telling the delegates:

The Chicago Federation of Labor has consented to be our hosts for the 1957 Convention in Chicago. It will be held at the only available time and place suitable for a joint convention of the AFL-CIO State Bodies. The Hilton Hotel has guaranteed 2,000 rooms for the use of the delegates, with special reduced rates. The Grand Ballroom is large enough, with the adjoining foyer, to seat all delegates—assembly style. Everything will be under one roof during the convention time.[53]

Still, a final agreement proved elusive. By late summer two seemingly irreconcilable differences became clear. First and foremost was the question of scope—what was the purpose of the Illinois AFL-CIO? To Reuben and his ISFL members, the duty of a state-level labor body was to establish and implement a legislative program. Collective bargaining was handled by either local or national and international unions, depending on the nature and size of the dispute. The state body played no role in either calling for a strike or negotiating terms. Likewise, community and civil rights issues were within the purview of the relevant central labor body, not the state organization. While the state body could speak or assist on other matters, the primary function of the organization had to be legislative activity.[54]

The CIO, on the other hand, insisted on a “broadening philosophy” of the state-level body. They insisted on language allowing the Illinois AFL-CIO to intervene in collective bargaining within the state.[55] Most importantly, they demanded a co-equal emphasis on all labor concerns and programs. As Robert Johnston told the ISFL:

I certainly could not sell the interpretation that the legislative program is 99% or even the primary function of the organization. I see all the other programs just as important parts of the over-all program and I must have it clear that Community Services, Civil Rights, Political Education and Farm Labor are just as important.[56]

This question of whether legislative activity would be a duty or the primary duty of the Illinois AFL-CIO was a crucial difference, one which played a critical role in the question of funding and staffing. If state legislation was the primary purpose of the organization, then it would make sense for the president and his secretary-treasurer to personally oversee the implementation of labor’s legislative agenda. Conversely, if such legislation was only one of a number of equally important goals, then the president would be derelict in dedicating so much time to Springfield, and would have to rely on a committee and staff to act largely in his stead.

This dispute was closely tied to leadership. As ISFL President, Soderstrom had broad authority with regard to those issues that fell within his purview. He was given great discretion to accomplish the goals established by the executive board. The Illinois CIO, in stark contrast to both the ISFL and its own national counterpart, had adopted a de-centralized model of leadership. This was partly out of necessity; the early Industrial Council had been unable to pay its president, forcing the executive (who was typically otherwise employed) to rely on others. This had over time created a very limited presidency; in the words of ISFL Vice President John Kinsella:

Their outlook is entirely different to ours. With them the President is just incidental. All he does is preside at conventions and board meetings. Usually he has another full-time job. They have a different idea than we do.[57]

Authority within the Illinois CIO instead fell to the committees, constitutionally-mandated bodies that formulated and enforced policies. While far less effective, this system had spread power broadly, investing control in a number of individuals and institutions that felt threatened by the idea of a strong presidency. They fiercely argued not only for the preservation of the committee system but against any presidential power over it. As ISFL attorney Asher noted with alarm, “Constitutional committees are very dangerous. Much of [the Illinois CIO’s] wording has been taken from the AFL-CIO Constitution, but they have left out much that clarifies President Meany’s powers.”[58]

These conflicts over the proposed organization’s scope and leadership came to a head in the fight over how the politics of Springfield were to be handled. Reuben was open to the idea of a legislative committee, but he was insistent that he continue to operate as he had—with him and his Secretary-Treasurer personally overseeing the agenda. The reason, he bluntly said, was simple: the CIO approach didn’t work. “It’s usually a month before [the CIO legislative committee members] appear in Springfield, and at that time most of our bills have been introduced,” he told the executive board in a meeting that August. “They do not believe in continual attendance during the session, which we have found to be the only successful program to follow.”[59]

The CIO—particularly Robert Johnston—made elaborate and forceful protests. He demanded not only that a legislative committee be written into the Constitution, but that such a committee be given ultimate authority. He rejected any draft that stipulated the president “shall have supervision” over the committee, and likewise refused to give the president the authority to remove members.[60] After a particularly contentious meeting that August, it became clear that neither organization was willing to budge. The CIO broke off negotiations, with Johnston stating “It would be useless for us at this time to discuss changing specific language when there are fundamental issues involved.”[61] After some half-hearted attempts to revive talks, CIO attorney Abe Brussell called his ISFL counterpart to inform him that, “At this time no further meetings between our respective groups is feasible.”[62]

Soderstrom had no choice but to announce that the State AFL-CIO merger would not occur as scheduled. As the Mt. Vernon Register-News reported on August 29:

Reuben Soderstrom, AFL president in Illinois, said Wednesday his organization still planned to hold its own convention and hoped it would turn into a merger convention. Soderstrom said a disagreement occurred 10 days ago over the draft of a constitution and the other organization broke off negotiations. However, he described the disagreement as minor and natural considering it involved “two organizations that have been trying to destroy each other for 20 years.” Soderstrom added that since nationwide units of the two labor organizations had been united, state merger was inevitable. Both the AFL and CIO state organizations will submit their views of the opposing constitutional drafts to George Meany, AFL-CIO national president, for a judgment.[63]

President Meany, however, did not view the disagreement as minor, nor did he see a merger as inevitable. The AFL-CIO was in clearly uncharted territory; the national body had issued a deadline of December 5, 1957, and many viewed his ability to complete this task as the first important test of his authority. While it was not clear to anyone what would happen if the merger failed to occur by then, Meany wrote to Reub making sure he understood what could occur: the AFL-CIO President curtly told Soderstrom that, if necessary, he had the authority to strip both groups of their charters, effectively burning the entire house down, in order to rebuild a more compliant organization.[64] To assist in negotiations, Meany sent Regional Director of Organizational Work Eugene Moats and Special Assistant Peter McGavin to sit down and meet with both groups in advance of their Chicago conventions.

Reuben understood the stakes. The third draft, which did not empower Soderstrom, was the last agreed draft written before talks broke down. The simplest solution for Moats and McGavin would have been to recommend Meany force the ISFL to accept the merger on that draft or face dissolution. To prevent this, Soderstrom told his executive board, the Illinois Federation had to get to Meany’s minders first.[65] When Moats and McGavin arrived for a joint Illinois AFL-CIO meeting at the Conrad Hilton Hotel on September 3, Soderstrom was there waiting for them, answering their questions and assuring them that the ISFL was willing to do what was necessary for unity. In return, Soderstrom secured commitments from McGavin that “the Illinois State Federation of Labor will not be forced to change its legislative program of work. I’m not here to put on any rush act.”[66]

When the CIO did arrive, Reuben let them do all the talking, confident that Robert Johnston’s confrontational manner would work to his advantage. While Germano and Hayes did make some points, it was Johnston who took center stage, attacking the ISFL and contradicting his own president in the process. As soon as Germano finished telling Meany’s special assistant that he had “No thought on our part to take power from officers and give it to committees...we want to strengthen Reub’s hand,” Johnston cut in, telling McGavin:

The Auto Workers will not merge to concentrate legislative work in two people. Illinois is pinpointed for right to work legislation! The Committee on Legislation is very important. No two can run it. You need a strategy and policy planning committee. You need top people assisting in the full sense of the word. Any misstep in this field could bring disaster. We insist that reliable top-notch people be on this committee with both feet in the planning and strategy stages…Our Board would now insist on this, even with the third draft.[67]

Ignoring Johnston, Reuben turned to McGavin and said, “I have a commitment from the governor that he will veto any right-to-work bill. The CIO brought in three new leaders who had to be brought up to date.”[68] With two sentences, Soderstrom eviscerated Johnston’s case. There was no need for committees full of “top-notch men” running around if they didn’t even know what was going on. McGavin had heard enough. True to his word, he did not recommend a merger based on the third draft. Negotiations would continue.

While it was a tactical victory, Reuben knew that he was still on borrowed time. He needed to find meaningful compromise that both his ISFL and the CIO could accept. Patience was wearing thin all around; in the year to come, he would have to turn this gang of adversaries into a single team, overcoming personal, professional, and political differences to fight labor’s battles together. It was a task he was ready for. As he told the delegates gathered in the Grand Ballroom of the Conrad Hilton Hotel:

Lack of unity in the labor movement is, of course, a great hazard to working people. It is a hazard in the political field and also in the legislative field. In this day and age, it is definitely a great hazard in the economic field. Unity of state federations, and city central bodies, would be the greatest step forward ever taken by organized labor in Illinois. For twenty years we have failed to fully co-operate with each other because of this existing organic division. In fact, there were times when raiding and other menacing activities were actually designed to harass and destroy each other. All of that is history—and by uniting our labor movement, from top to bottom, it would conceivably make such antagonistic incidents definitely a thing of the past. Our natural union instincts and common sense tells us we ought to be united and working together in closer unity and more unitedly than ever before, to improve the hours, wages, and working conditions of every shop, every trade, every factory and industry in this great State![69]

Reuben was speaking for unity and clearly standing his ground to be the single, unifying voice for labor in the state of Illinois.

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